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Abstract
Recently, Kaleckian models of distribution and growth have been extended in order to
take monetary aspects into account. The interest rate, the debt-capital and equity-capital
ratios of rms, and an interest elastic mark-up have been included in the model. Empirical
assessments of how this models depict reality are still rare. This paper seeks to contribute
to this research. In the rst part, the eects of an exogenous variation of the monetary
rate of interest on the equilibrium rates of capacity utilization, capital accumulation, and
prots are discussed theoretically within the framework of an extended post-Kaleckian
growth model in the vein of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). In the second part, the model
is confronted with annual data on the US and Germany from 1960 to 2007. With a
simple ADL approach, the parameters of the post-Kaleckian growth model are estimated
and applied to dierent time periods, i.e. the total period, two sub-periods, six business
cycles. For both countries, we identify typical post-Keynesian regimes with demand, ac-
cumulation, and prots responding negatively to increasing interest rates. Moreover, we
nd that demand, accumulation, and prots have been wage-led in the US, whereas the
Germany economy has been a wage-led demand and a prot-led accumulation and prot
regime. We nd that conservative monetary policy contributed to the economic downturn
in the US and in Germany, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively.
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1 Introduction
Why study monetary economics?
The 1970s and 1980s faced a fundamental shift in the leading paradigm of economic policy.
Keynesianism, the conviction that markets have to be led by government authorities in
order to make for high levels of economic growth, employment and distributive justice,
was increasingly discredited since it was seen unable to handle the economic turbulences
of the 1970s. Promising to get rid of inationary tendencies, monetarism grew to the
new leading doctrine of economic policy. The Monetarist program, rst implemented by
Reagan and Thatcher in the early 1980s, comprised restrictive economic as well as social
policy packages. Also the mainstream in monetary policy experienced a signicant change.
Whereas central banks were particularly concerned about growth and employment under
the Keynesian paradigm, they have been concentrating more or less exclusively on the
maintenance of price stability in the age of monetarism.
Central banks of the major industrialized countries adopted Monetarist policy instru-
ments already in the mid 1970s.
1
Following Friedman's (1956, 1960 and 1970) Monetarist
program, central banks stopped targeting the rate of interest and switched to mone-
tary targeting instead. From the commitment to contain the growth of selected mone-
tary aggregates within predetermined limits they expected to be able to reduce ination.
Moreover, central banks were beholden to rely on restrictive monetary policy implying
consequent adherence to low monetary growth and high interest rates. As Monetarists
deny monetary eects on the long-run performance of the economy, ghting ination as-
cended to the primary objective of central banks, while aiming at high levels of growth
1
To be precise, the implementation of monetarism to monetary policy was unique in each country
and varied signicantly in the radicalness by which it was indoctrinated: The Federal Reserve ocially
switched to monetary targeting in 1975, but never lost track of the interest rates and never followed
the Monetarist program dogmatically (cf. Volcker and Gyohten 1992, pp. 163-86, Wood 2005, pp. 375-
89 and Bernanke and Mishkin 1992). The Bank of England gradually introduced monetary targeting
in the 1970s reaching its climax under the Thatcher-government in the early 1980s (cf. Bernanke and
Mishkin 1992 and Hall 1986, ch. 5). The Banque de France began to target monetary aggregates in 1976.
However, targets were set by the government and thus not followed very eectually (cf. Galbraith 1982).
The German Bundesbank implemented monetary targeting in the mid 1970s. Apart from some exchange
rate considerations, the Bundesbank forcefully followed its strategy of containing monetary growth in the
1980s and maintained conservative monetary policy throughout the 1990s (cf. Bernanke and Mishkin
1992 and Arestis and Chortareas 2006, pp. 380-4).
1
and employment was either eclipsed or simply removed from the agenda.
In the 1990s a host of central banks switched to ination targeting
2
, which is still the
predominant strategy of monetary policy today.
3
Since there is no reliable relationship
between the targeted monetary aggregate and goal variables, such as ination, central
banks that were seriously engaged in monetary targeting found themselves systematically
missing their desired monetary policy goals (Bernanke and Mishkin 1992). Thus, central
banks adopted a policy framework which allowed them to target ination directly without
necessarily considering monetary aggregates (Rochon and Rossi 2006). The interest rate
of short term money markets turned out to be the operating instrument of central banks.
Whilst central banks adopted conservative monetary policy, many Western economies
faced a slump in economic growth in the 1980s implying sustainable economic stagnation
and an increase in unemployment especially of the European economies (cf. Schulmeister
1996). For two selected countries - the US and (West-)Germany
4
- the relationship be-
tween the monetary and real variables is depicted in gure 1 and gure 2. The trends of
the real short-term interest rate (is) have been contrasted with the trends of the rate of
accumulation (gI), i.e. the growth rate of the net capital stock, and of the growth rate
of real net domestic income (y˙) from 1960 to 2007.5 The real short-term interest rate
is assumed to be strongly inuenced by the central bank.
6
Both economies considered
start with comparatively low interest rates in the 1960s, which changed fundamentally
with the upsurge of monetarism in the late 1970s and early 1980s when interest rates
sharply increased. While the FED relaxed its monetary policy from the 1990s, German
interest rates remained on a high level until the late 1990s.
7
As for accumulation and
economic growth, falling trends can be observed in each economy over the entire period
2
Ination targeting essentially implies the central bank's accountable commitment to price stability
as the primary objective of monetary policy and the commitment to achieve ination targets which have
to be announced in public regularly. Emphasis is put on high transparency regarding monetary policy
strategies (Bernanke et al. 1999, p. 4).
3
The Federal Reserve does not ocially target ination. However, as Mishkin (2004) points out, the
FED follows a strategy which is implicitly highly concerned with containing ination in the long run.
4
In the following, Germany refers to West Germany until 1990 and, thereafter, to unied Germany.
5
As we are interested in the trends, all variables have been smoothed by applying a Hodrick-Prescott
lter (λ = 100).
6
Skott (1989, p. 57) and Lavoie (1996b, p. 538) argue that central banks can determine the real
interest rate provided prices are sticky, at least in the short run.
7
The German Bundesbank justied its contractory monetary policy by referring to a demand shock
caused by the German unication in 1991.
2
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Figure 1: The rate of accumulation (gI), the growth rate of real net domestic income (y˙)
and the real short-term interest rate (is) in the US, 1960-2007; Sources: Cf. table A1
of time. Especially in the 1980s, the slowdown of accumulation and growth is associated
with increasing rates of interest. From the 1990s, a relaxation of the US monetary pol-
icy comes along with a stabilization of accumulation and growth on a medium level. In
Germany, interest rates stayed on a relatively high level throughout the 1990s. A further
slowdown of the economic dynamics can be observed in this period. It is also interesting
to note that by trend real short-term interest rates have been higher then real economic
growth up from the 1980s whereas in the preceding period this relationship was reversed
(cf. Schulmeister 1996).
Several essential questions arise from the trends in gure 1 and gure 2: First, can the
economic performances of the US and Germany be explained by their respective monetary
policy? Second, did the 1980s shift in the doctrine of monetary policy contribute to the
deterioration of the economic dynamics? If so, to what extent? Third, given the dierent
degrees of ambition by which the FED and the ECB plus her sister, the Bundesbank,
have been pursuing Monetarist objectives, can dierences in US-American and German
economic growth be related to discrepancies in the respective alignments of monetary
policy? The question whether monetary policy has long-term impacts on the performance
3
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Figure 2: The rate of accumulation (gI), the growth rate of real net domestic income (y˙)
and the real short-term interest rate (is) in Germany, 1960-2007; Sources: Cf. table A1
of the economy is crucial especially for public authorities who are supposed to utilize policy
instruments in such a manner that high economic growth and employment are enforced.
Finding a negative long-run relationship between the short-term interest rate, a variable
which is to a great extent controlled by the central bank, and the real sphere of the
economy would challenge both previous political practice and orthodox economic theory.
Studying monetary economics: in which framework?
Although orthodox economics consists of several competing traditions with varying promi-
nence in time, all of these currents are unied by the claim that monetary policy is neutral
in the long run. This is obvious for the Monetarist program a lá Friedman, which was
dropped, however, by most central banks in the 1990s since the diculty of steering mon-
etary aggregates became apparent. It was succeeded by the new Keynesian consensus
view on macroeconomics which is the leading economic paradigm today and according
to Taylor (2000, p. 90), pervasive in policy-research projects at universities and central
banks around the world. It constitutes the theoretical foundation of ination targeting
regimes which were adopted by most central banks in the 1990s. Since it incorporates pol-
4
icy reaction functions into macroeconomic analysis and implicitly assumes an endogenous
money stock, the new consensus view deviates from traditional neo-Classical economics
(Palley 2007). However, while Keynesian by name, the new consensus view is Monetarist
by nature (cf. Rochon 2006 and DeLong 2000): Ination is conceived as a strictly demand
determined phenomenon. It is believed to emerge only when aggregate demand exceeds
aggregate supply, i.e. when unemployment under-runs its natural level which is deter-
mined on the labor market. Since the economy is assumed to be expanding alongside a
natural growth path, monetary policy cannot aect output and employment in the long
run. Thus, new-Keynesians in Monetarist fashion, believe that loose monetary policy, in
particular easing key interest rates, necessarily and solely leads to ination in the long run
(Palley 2007, p. 69). As monetary authorities do not have the possibilities to stimulate
growth in the new consensus view, they are suggested to specialize in the only objective
they can really handle: to contain ination through restrictive monetary policy.
8
Proceeding to the core of the new consensus model, we nd well known classical and
neo-Classical concepts, such as the natural rates of output and unemployment which are
both associated with the Monetarist NAIRU theory (Arestis and Sawyer 2002, p. 536).
Assuming a vertical long-run Phillips curve and employing a natural rate of interest induce
monetary policy to cause ination and to be neutral in determining long-run growth of
output (Arestis and Sawyer 2002, p. 530 and Lavoie 2004, pp. 21-2). However, heterodox
economists expressed lurking doubts regarding the feasibility and reasonability of the
macroeconomic content of these concepts (cf. Shulman 1989, Settereld 2006 and Niggle
2006) and their microeconomic foundation (cf. Lavoie 1992a, pp. 6-41). The neo-Classical
economy is driven by utility maximizing individuals who base their decisions on unlimited
knowledge of all alternatives and their payos. As for future events, they form rational
expectations and maximize intertemporal optimization problems. In aggregate, markets
devoid of government intervention, trade unionism and other distortions cause prices to
fully reect market preferences and to equilibrate supply and demand to clear the market.
In the neo-Classical framework, free markets involve optimal economic outcomes, such as
8
Ination targeting central bankers are well aware of negative short run eects of tight monetary policy
which they intend to measure by sacrice ratios. However, they merely care about short run stability as
long as ination targets are not jeopardized (Rochon 2006, p. 552)
5
full employment and unimpeded output growth. Rigidities in the labor market prevent the
real wage from conciliating supply and demand, thus causing unemployment. Introducing
money to the neo-Classical framework does not change the characteristics of the economy.
Since economic agents form rational expectations, which are assumed to be fullled in the
medium run, a change in the monetary variables will eventually be fully compensated
by a corresponding adjustment of prices. This will have no impact on employment and
output. Rather, it will cause ination.
Due to its lack of realism, we do not want to tackle the question of whether and
how monetary policy might aect the real economy within the neo-Classical framework.
Rather, we want to contrast the neo-Classical view of monetary neutrality with a post-
Keynesian, in particular with a Kaleckian approach, which attaches great importance to
describing reality and which oers convenient tools for investigating economic dynamics
both theoretically and empirically. In this paper, we want to utilize an extended version of
a Kaleckian model of distribution and growth. Including monetary variables in the model,
we want to investigate the eects of variations in the interest rates on the economic
performance in the long run. We shall also consider the impact on functional income
distribution, for both cost and demand factors determine private economic activity in
the post-Keynesian framework, as shall be explored in the next chapter. A profound
theoretical discussion of the Kaleckian growth and distribution model shall lead the way
to an empirical investigation of the impact monetary policy had in the US and in Germany.
These countries have been chosen because of their economic weight and because of the
dierence in their central banks' nature: the Bundesbank and the ECB, respectively,
following a strictly conservative, the FED a rather pragmatic approach (cf. Fontana 2006).
Literature on post-Kaleckian growth and distribution models
It took post-Keynesians until the 1980s to start forging a monetary theory of production,
which Keynes (1973b, xiii, p. 408) set out for already in 1933. The early growth theories
of the old Cambridge school, in particular of Kaldor (1956, 1957 and 1961) and Robinson
(1962) on the one hand and of Kalecki (1954) and Steindl (1952) on the other, did not
6
explicitly consider monetary variables in their work.
9
However, they prepared the ground
for subsequent post-Keynesian monetary analysis (Vernengo and Rochon 2001 and Sawyer
2001). Especially, Kalecki's aggregate supply-aggregate demand models turned out to be
accessible to contemporary post-Keynesian monetary growth theory.
10
Staying close with his original writings, Rowthorn (1981), Dutt (1984) and Amadeo
(1986) formalized Kalecki's work in the 1980s and established so called underconsump-
tionist models in which a strong accelerator eect guarantees that increasing wages have
expansive eects on the economy. In their seminal paper, Bhaduri and Marglin (1990)
enhanced the Kaleckian theory of distribution and growth modifying the traditional in-
vestment function in order to allow for both wage-led and prot-led accumulation regimes.
Since the cost-side of wages is also accounted for in their model, an increase in the wage
share does not necessarily translate into higher accumulation and growth. Positive de-
mand eects might be overcompensated by negative cost eects on investment.
Post-Kaleckian growth models in Bhaduri and Marglin's (1990) tenor have continually
been subject to extensions involving the consideration of the open economy (cf. Blecker
1989 and Bhaduri and Marglin 1990), of technological progress (cf. Dutt 2003) and, of
course, of monetary aspects such as the rate of interest and the rms' debt and equity
structure.
11
The introduction of the interest rate to Kaleckian models rests upon a hori-
zontalist view on money supply: The interest rate - steered by the central bank - is given
exogenously, while the amount of credit adjusts endogenously according to the need of
business.
The interest rate enters post-Kaleckian models in several ways with contradicting
impacts on the economy: A rise in the interest rate implies redistribution of income from
rms to rentiers: On the one hand, this will have contracting eects on the economy
9
For an outline of Kaldorian, Robinsonian and Kaleckian growth theory, see Lavoie (1992a, ch. 6) and
Hein (2004, ch. 7-8).
10
For the analysis of monetary variables in Kaldorian and Robinsonian growth models, see Lavoie
(1995) and Vernengo and Rochon (2001).
11
For an overview of the incorporation of interest rates to various post-Keynesian growth models see
Lavoie (1995). For monetary extensions of traditional Kaleckian models see Taylor (1985), Dutt (1992)
and Dutt and Amadeo (1992). Lavoie (1993), Hein (1998) and Hein and Ochsen (2003) introduced the
interest rate to post-Kaleckian models. For Kaleckian models including the debt structure of rms, see
Hein (2007). For recent literature analyzing the impacts of the shareholder value on accumulation and
growth by including the rms' equity structure to the model, see Hein (2008) and Hein and van Treeck
(2008) for an overview.
7
since rms lose funds available to nance investment. On the other, as rentiers consume
a part of their income, raising the rate of interest also has expansive eects through an
increased consumption demand. Moreover, through an interest elastic mark-up increasing
interest rates can have both positive and negative eects on accumulation and growth,
respectively, depending on whether the economy is wage-led or prot-led.
Post-Keynesian literature provides several empirical studies of Kaleckian and post-
Kaleckian distribution and growth models. This work attempts to gure out the type of
accumulation regimes economies are confronted with.
12
However, to the authors' knowl-
edge, there has been only one attempt to analyze the eects of interest rate variations
on growth and distribution empirically within a Kaleckian framework which has been
endeavored by Hein and Ochsen (2003). Our paper seeks to contribute to the empirical
literature by estimating the impacts of interest rate variations on output, accumulation
and prots.
Hein and Ochsen (2003) set up a post-Kaleckian growth model including the rate of
interest and estimate the model's parameters for some advanced OECD countries using
annual data from 1960 to 1995. For the entire period, they nd negative impacts of rising
interest rates on growth, accumulation and prots in France and in Germany, but not in
the UK or in the USA where they observe no signicant eects. Looking at sub-periods,
they nd equivocal results: In France, an increase in the interest rate was associated with
a contraction of all three endogenous variables until the early 1980s, whereas no signicant
relationships could be found afterwards. In Germany, the accumulation regime changed:
In the rst period, rising interest rates led to a contraction, in the second period to an
expansion of growth, accumulation and prots. In the USA, only accumulation did not
increase as a response to increasing interest rates in the rst sub-period. In the second,
expansive eects on all three variables were observed. The authors conclude that their
estimations do not oer a good explanation for the economic downturn in the aftermath of
the 1980ss recession. Several potential reasons for this can be identied: First, as Hein and
Ochsen (2003, p. 426) note, the failure to consider the impacts variations of the interest
12
Prominent contributions to the empirical analysis of post-Kaleckian models are, amongst others,
Marglin and Bhaduri (1990), Bowles and Boyer (1995), Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) and Hein and
Vogel (2008).
8
rate have on the distribution of income between rms and workers is a crucial shortcoming
of the empirical model applied. Second, the estimation of the savings function, is based on
an unsatisfying calculation of the rentiers' income.
13
Third, the rms' indebtedness which
inuences the sensitivity of investment towards interest rate variations is not taken into
account. Fourth, for some sub-periods OLS-regressions have been applied to less than 15
observations which does not allow for signicant results. Thus, Hein and Ochsen's (2003)
results must be kept in perspective.
Overview
In the present paper, we establish a post-Kaleckian growth model and derive the equilibria
of output, accumulation and prots as well as the conditions for dierent economic regimes
with respect to interest rate variations. We then confront the model with the data of the
USA and Germany from 1960 to 2007, estimate the coecients by applying a simple ADL
approach and determine the demand, accumulation and prot regimes of both countries
for the entire period, for two sub-periods and for six business cycles. In doing so, we
shall account for the shortcomings of Hein and Ochsen's (2003) contribution: First, we
take into account the interest elasticity of the income distribution between rms and
workers. Second, data on rentiers' income is derived from national accounts. Third,
we also include the debt-capital ratio of rms in our econometric model. Fourth, we
abstain from estimating sub-periods due to a lack of observations, but we simply apply
our estimated coecients of the entire period under consideration to the sub-periods.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we will briey discuss the constitutive
concepts of post-Keynesian economics. In section 3, a post-Kaleckian aggregate supply-
aggregate demand model including an interest elastic prot share, the net debt-capital
ratio and the net equity-capital ratio will be developed. The eects of interest rate
variations on capacity utilization, on capital accumulation and on the prot rate will be
analyzed and conditions for dierent accumulation regimes derived. Section 4 confronts
the model with data of the US and Germany. The coecients of the model are estimated
13
Since appropriate data is not available, Hein and Ochsen simply multiply the interest rate with the
nominal capital stock and assume that this amount is distributed to the households.
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and accumulation regimes identied. In section 5, some conclusions are drawn.
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2 The post-Keynesian economic framework
The work of John Maynard Keynes has been an inspiration of generations of heterodox
economists. Not only his well known General Theory (1936), but also his Treatise on
Money (1930) and his Treatise on Probability (1921) should turn out to be pathbreaking
for a new current of economic thinking.
However, the majority of economists inuenced by Keynes grew up within the frame-
work of neoclassical economics and were aliated to mainstream ideas. Thus Keynes' eco-
nomics was mainly applied in short run analysis. The main academic challenge within the
mainstream was to link the Keynesian possibility of involuntary unemployment with the
neo-Classical concept of market clearing. Accordingly, economists such as Hicks (1937)
and Samuelson (1947 and 1955), claimed the utilization of sticky prices for economic
analysis to be the main achievement of Keynes. Sticky prices were blamed to cause un-
employment in the short run. In this perspective the Keynesian approach has never been
a real attack on the core features of neo-Classical economics.
The interpretation of Keynes' work by economists at Cambridge University, such as
Joan Robinson (1956), Richard Kahn (1972) and Nicholas Kaldor (1956 and 1957), were
fundamentally dierent to the mainstream perception. For them, Keynes formed the basis
on which the development of a heterodox approach to economics could be continued.
These economists rejected the foundations of the neo-Classical framework and formed
an economic framework, which should be developed and rened by economists of later
generations under the label post-Keynesian economics (Lavoie 1992a, p. 1)
Although coming from a totally dierent context than Keynes, Michal Kalecki (1954,
1969 and 1971) is not less important for the development of the post-Keynesian approach.
As a Polish economist he was strongly inuenced by Marx. Nevertheless, Kalecki's ideas
are at the core of post-Keynesian economics today.
In the following, we want to briey discuss the core features of the post-Keynesian
framework, in particular, the post-Keynesian microeconomic footing, the Keynesian and
Kaleckian principles of eective demand, and the post-Keynesian perceptions of money
and interest.
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2.1 Economic behavior in a world of fundamental uncertainty
Contrary to neo-Classical economics, the primary post-Keynesian objective has always
been to explain the world as observed empirically (Eichner and Kregel 1975, p. 1309).
As we shall see in this section, this is in particular reected by its microeconomics. More-
over, as we shall argue here, post-Keynesian microeconomics is highly consistent with its
macroeconomics.
The post-Keynesian economic agent is taking decisions in a world of fundamental un-
certainty. Uncertainty implies that households or rms do not have the basis of informa-
tion that would be required in order to solve their individual intertemporal optimization
problem. The probabilities and the values of potential outcomes as well as the set of these
outcomes resulting from a choice are simply unknown to the individual (Lavoie 1992a, p.
44). Thus, the neo-Classical perception of uncertainty as calculable probabilistic risk is
peremptorily rejected by post-Keynesians. Individuals' economic decisions are based on
expectations about the future formed on exceptionally weak foundations. According to
Keynes,
most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences
of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a
result of animal spirits - of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inac-
tion, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benets
multiplied by quantitative probabilities. (Keynes 1973a, vii, p. 161)
The consequences of uncertainty on the macroeconomic level are extensive. Uncer-
tainty particularly aects the investment behavior of rms. In a world of fundamental
uncertainty rms do not know the prospective yield of an investment. According to
Keynes (1973a, vii, p. 161) animal spirits are the driving force of private entrepreneur-
ship. Thus investment demand is subject to strong exogenous uctuations. This gives rise
to the argument that the random shifts of investment demand do not allow for its proper
modeling (cf. Shackle 1992, p. 218). Following this view, post-Keynesian economics
would be constrained to short run analysis. Without a theory of investment, no long run
conclusions can be drawn. Since we are interested in economic growth, specically in its
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sensitivity in respect of changes in the interest rate, we reject this line of argument. This
is where conventions come in.
Uncertainty does not lead to chaotic behavior of economic agents. Quite the contrary:
In the face of uncertainty, rational individuals generate norms of behavior which the follow.
Agents base their economic decisions on conventions, on rules of thumbs.
14
Individuals'
expectations about the future rest upon experiences in the past. If a decision worked out
satisfyingly in the past, than there is no reason to deviate from this choice in the future.
As Keynes puts it,
in practice we have agreed, as a rule, to fall back on what is, in truth, a
convention. The essence of this convention - though it does not, of course,
work out quite so simply - lies in assuming that the existing state of aairs
will continue indenitely, except in so far as we have specic reasons to expect
a change. (Keynes 1973a, vii, p. 152)
Conventions are easy to identify on both the consumer and the producer side. Con-
sumption expenditures are strongly inuenced by habits. Similarly, investment behavior
is not only determined by somewhat arbitrary animal spirits, but it is also dependent on
conventions: Liquidity ratios, leverage ratios and the normal rate of capacity utilization
(Lavoie 1992a, p. 55).
The existence of conventions is a blessing for long run analysis: The agents' conven-
tional behavior allows for periods of stability providing a basis for economic models of
investment and consumption as long as no fundamental changes occur in the context.
Conventions are a source of stability, rather than instability. Individuals do not respond
to every single change in the environment, because they do not maximize utility (Lavoie
1992a, p. 60).
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Conventions are not arbitrary. They are the consequence of rational individuals reacting to a world
of fundamental uncertainty (cf. Crotty 1990). Individuals are not rational in the neo-Classical sense,
by which they optimize their objective function within a set of perfectly known constraints imposed
by the economic environment. In post-Keynesian microeconomics economic behavior is characterized
by procedural rationality (Simon 1976, p. 130). It requires that individuals base their decisions on
appropriate deliberation (Simon 1976, p. 130). Agents are rational as long as their behavior relies on
adequate reasoning. The post-Keynesian perception of rationality also accounts for subjective constraints
in gathering and processing information (Lavoie 1992a, p. 51). For the procedure of decision-making is
costly, especially in a world of uncertainty and insucient capabilities, individuals relying on norms act
rationally.
13
2.2 The role of classes
For post-Keynesians, agents do not optimize some kind of objective function. Macroe-
conomic outcomes of individual behavior is not the sum of the agents' optimal choices.
In short, individuals' preferences are not the only and by far not the most important
determinant of economic activity. Thus, there is no point in putting the individual into
the heart of economic analysis.
Accordingly, post-Keynesians regard social classes as the subject of analysis.
15
There-
fore, post-Keynesian models rest upon the patterns of the behavior of social classes. They
raise questions concerning the distribution of income and of social power, concerning the
interdependence of macroeconomic variables such as protability, savings propensities,
income distribution, interest rates and economic growth. Considering the individual as
a social being allows for fallacies of composition in macroeconomics: An option which
seems optimal to an individual may bring about a macroeconomic outcome inferior to the
previous situation, if the option has been chosen by everyone (Lavoie 1992a, pp. 10-11).
2.3 The post-Keynesian rm
In neo-Classical economics a representative rm's only objective is to maximize prots
by producing a certain level of output that equilibrates market price and marginal cost.
It is characterized by decreasing returns to scale and operating in an environment of
perfect competition. In contrast to the strong assumptions of neo-Classical economics,
post-Keynesians follow a more realistic approach.
The rm's objectives
The post-Keynesian rm, which our forthcoming analysis will be based on, operates in a
context of oligopolistic competition. Firms face a limited number of rivals who engage in
the same market. By the urge to survive (Robinson 1962, p. 38) companies are forced
15
This is consistent with the post-Keynesian notion of individuals. For post-Keynesians individuals
are social beings, shaped by their context and their culture, their behavior inuenced and constrained by
socioeconomic classes, social norms and institutions, respectively. Conversely individuals aect their own
context, the framework of their economic behavior. This heterodox view accounts for the interdependence
between individuals, the social structure and its institutions (cf. Lavoie 1992a, p. 10).
14
to focus on the long run and to follow strategies which consolidate the future position
in the market.
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An essential means to achieve this objective is the pricing policy of the
rm. Prices, set strategically, allow for prots necessary for future investment and can
prevent the entry of additional competitors into the market. Prices are set by rms and
are generally not the result of market forces (Lavoie 1992a, p. 95).
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Strategic price setting is an important but not the only objective of post-Keynesian
rms. In order to consolidate and improve their market position rms are also eager
to get control over their suppliers, to have access to cheap funds for investment and to
inuence national and international legislation. The power to carry out each of these
objectives is dependent on the size of the company (Galbraith 1975, p. 56). Thus, what a
post-Keynesian rm is centrally occupied with, is to boost its growth in size and market
shares (Robinson 1962, p. 38). As we shall argue now, prots are the source of growth
and thus the condition for gaining and sustaining market power.
Expansion implies the growth of the rms' capital stock. Thus, investment is the
condition for growth. In order to nance this investment, rms can either use retained
earnings or raise funds on the nancial markets via bank credits, bonds or stocks. However,
rms face nancial constraints that limit the possibility to raise funds for investment. The
limitations depend on the protability of the rm. This for two reasons: First, retained
earnings and thus the possibilities to utilize own funds increase with realized prots, in
specic with the realized prot rate. Second, the access to funds from banks and nancial
markets is also dependent on retained earnings. According to Kalecki's (1937) principle of
increasing risk, which characterizes the behavior of lenders and borrowers in the context
of fundamental uncertainty, the willingness of lenders to grant loans to a rm depends
on the latter's credit-worthiness, which is indicated by its current cash ow compared
16
In recent decades, the rise of the shareholder value attenuated the rms' desire to grow. As Lazon-
ick and O'Sullivan (2000) argue, accretive shareholder orientation in corporate governance moved the
management's primary objective from retain and invest somewhat towards downsize and redistribute.
Under the heading of nancialization, this phenomenon has been analyzed extensively by, amongst oth-
ers, Stockhammer (2004a, 2005-06), Hein (2008), Hein and van Treeck (2008) and van Treeck (2008). In
our post-Kaleckian macro model, we will take account for the inuence of the rms' shareholder value
orientation.
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Not all rms have the ability to set prices - just a few of them. The price leaders consist of a
minority of companies that are powerful enough to dominate markets and determine the prices. They set
the benchmark which price takers have to follow, because they do not have the power to inuence prices.
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to its nancial leverage. Given the rm's leverage, the lower the prot rate of the rm,
the riskier granted loans are for the bank. A rm not seeming credit-worthy due to
low prots and high leverage will face heavy constraints in trying to receive funds from
nancial institutions. According to Kalecki (1971, p. 106), rms do not want to raise
external funds either, given low cash ows and high nancial leverage, since they do not
want to take the risk to nd themselves in an illiquid situation. Taken together, high
protability enables rms to raise cheap funds - internal and external - which allow for
investment, growth and economic power.
As we have seen, the growth of the post-Keynesian rm is constrained by its protabil-
ity. Inversely, the prot rate feasible to a rm is constrained by the rm's growth rate.
Permanent adoption of new technologies and growing capacities to produce enable rms to
achieve higher sales, lower costs and thus higher prots. However, rms growing too fast
also face problems concerning protability, due to the so called Penrose eect (Penrose
1959): Excessive growth causes extra costs arising from additional marketing expenditures
and from the adoption of new technologies. Moreover, managers and employees must get
accustomed to the new operational environment (Lavoie 1992a, p. 115).
As we have argued in this section, the post-Keynesian rm's main objective is to
guarantee its long run survival. In order to achieve this, it attempts to accumulate power
by growth at the operational level, which is restricted by the prots of the rm required
to nance the expansion.
Excess capacity and the rm's cost curves
According to Lavoie (2006, p. 41), the shape of the cost curves is the core of the post-
Keynesian theory of the rm. Whereas the neo-Classical rms face increasing marginal
costs and produce at a unique level of output minimizing unit costs, post-Keynesian
rms are more exible in varying production, without sacricing cost eciency. Post-
Keynesians, following Eichner and Kregel (1975, p. 1305), assume constant returns to
scale and constant marginal costs up to full capacity utilization. Provided that rms have
spare capacities, they can increase production at constant unit direct costs and, taking
also xed costs into account, at decreasing unit costs. Due to economies of scale, higher
16
output accompanies lower unit costs. When full capacity is reached, increasing marginal
costs begin to apply causing unit costs to rise. According to this line of argument, rms
are expected to produce at full capacity utilization where unit costs are minimized (cf.
Lavoie 1992a, pp. 118-23).
However, rms generally do not produce at full capacity in the post-Keynesian mi-
croeconomic framework. Firms usually do not utilize their entire capital stock. This view
is based on Kalecki (1969) who most notably applied constant unit direct costs at excess
capacity in his macroeconomic models already in the 1930s (Lavoie 1992a, p. 123) and
it was further explored by Steindl (1952). As a matter of fact, rms do not exploit full
capacities in reality. They utilize roughly 70 to 85 per cent (Lavoie 2006, p. 41). The
reason for this, again, rests upon fundamental uncertainty. Firms cannot predict future
demand. If there is an unexpected increase in demand, they want to benet from higher
sales. Moreover, they do not want to lose market shares to domestic and foreign competi-
tors (Sylos-Labini 1971, p. 247). Thus, rms are required to adjust production in time.
Their only option is to leave spare capacities which they can utilize in case of unexpected
and enduring demand shifts.
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It is a strategy contributing to the rm's long run survival.
Cost-plus price setting
As we have argued, rms generally change their production volume in case of demand
shifts, not prices. This shall be further explored in the subsequent discussion of the
role of eective demand in post-Keynesian theory. For now, let us reconsider the price
setting policy of rms, which we want to presume later in our post-Kaleckian growth and
distribution model.
In general, post-Keynesian macroeconomic models assume rms to engage in cost-plus
pricing. It implies that rms set prices equal to their unit costs plus a mark-up (Lavoie
1992a, p. 129). In a simplied Kaleckian version of this pricing policy the mark-up is
assumed not to rely on overall unit costs but on unit direct costs instead (Kalecki 1971,
18
Inventories are not eligible, because they will run out if a permanent shift in demand is met. Invest-
ment in new plants and machinery takes too much time to be carried out. Hence, rms prefer to rely on
excess capacity, which enables them to react swiftly to unexpected uctuations in demand (Steindl 1952,
pp. 9-14).
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pp. 44-45). In both approaches the mark-up is supposed to account for desired prots, in
the latter also for potential xed costs. Mark-up prices are always set before the products
eventually meet their demand (Lavoie 2006, pp. 44-45). Thus, there is no feedback from
actual demand conditions assumed to inuence the pricing policy. Unit costs and the
mark-up are its only determinants.
Mark-up pricing rests upon the fact that rms operate in an oligopolistic environment,
where prices are governed by big corporations. Thus, the cost-plus pricing policy seems
to be valid only for market leaders. However, especially long run analysis does not depart
too much from reality when assuming that all rms are governed by the cost-plus pricing
rule for the following reason: Companies with relatively inecient cost structures will
face severe diculties raising funds for investment and growth, because they lack prots,
the condition for internal and external nance (cf. Steindl 1952, pp. 40-52). Thus, they
will drop out of the market in the long run. Only rms with sustainably low unit costs
will survive (Lavoie 2006, p. 50).
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The question arises, how the general mark-up implied by market leader's price setting
is determined. Following Kaldor (1985, pp. 50-51) rms set the mark-up within two
extrema: On the one hand, the objective to grow requires high mark-ups that allow for
high prots needed to nance investment. On the other, the objective to expand in market
shares requires low prices in order to be competitive. Thus, depending on the constraints
given by nance frontiers and market power, rms have to decide on their optimal mark-
up. Kalecki (1971, p. 168) emphasized another constraint to the corporate liberty to
set prices, the degree of monopoly in a market. The higher the market concentration the
higher the market power of the rms in this industry and the higher these rms can set
their mark-up without losing market shares. Moreover, the rms' ability to set prices is
also constrained by the relative power of the corporate sector or of an industry compared
to other social classes. The higher the bargaining power of trade unions the higher are the
workers' real wages. Increases in wage costs cannot be passed on easily to higher prices
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Of course, mark-ups dier between companies. Following Kalecki (1971, p. 44), the price set by a
rm does not only rely on unit costs and the prots it wants to achieve, but also on the pricing behavior
of competitors. Firms facing temporarily relatively high unit costs have to lower their mark-up in order
to provide competitive prices. Especially smaller and foreign rms with low market shares cannot pass
on increases in unit costs easily, since they are price takers.
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when the power of workers is strong (cf. Kalecki 1971, pp. 49-52).
2.4 The principle of eective demand
While neo-Classical economists accept the importance of eective demand in determining
the level of output and employment in the short run, they reject it for medium- and long-
run analysis. As they argue, production is constrained by the supply-side of the economy
in the long run. The economy is expected to converge towards a natural, supply-side
determined level of output. Accordingly, economic growth is determined by supply-side
factors such as population growth or technological progress (cf. Solow 1956 and Romer
1990). For post-Keynesians, however, the principle of eective demand is still valid in the
long run.
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The meaning of eective demand
According to the principle of eective demand, the production of goods ad-
justs itself to the demand for goods. [...] The economy is therefore demand-
determined, and not constrained by supply or given endowments. This means
investment is essentially independent of savings; investment and capital ac-
cumulation are not tied to the intertemporal consumption decisions of house-
holds. (Lavoie 2006, pp. 11-12)
This distinct denition of the core of post-Keynesian economics accounts for several
aspects of the principle of eective demand:
First, as Keynes (1973a, vii, pp. 27-28) argues, Say's Law - the proposition that
supply creates its own demand - is not valid. The economy is not supply constrained,
but restricted by the scale of eective demand comprising consumption and investment
demand. To outline his argument, Keynes assumes constant nominal wage rates. Given
an increase in employment, he argues, the additional income is consumed only partly.
Thus, not all of the additional output is consumed. Entrepreneurs are now facing an
20
As for the distinction between the short and the long run in the post-Keynesian framework, Lavoie
(2006, p. 84) argues that the dierence regards to the view on the stock of capital. In the short period
the capital stock is assumed to be constant. Thus, investment generates income, but does not alter the
capital stock. In the long period however, the capital stock is allowed to vary.
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unprotable situation, where aggregate supply is higher than aggregate demand, unless
investment demand increases in order to compensate for the dierence. Hence, given the
demand for investment and consumption, there is only one level of output and employment
consistent with equilibrium in the goods market.
Second, since the consumption behavior of individuals or, using Keynes' notation,
the propensity to consume is relatively stable (Keynes 1973a, vii, ch. 8-9), investment
demand, whether private or public, is the key to high employment (Keynes 1973a, vii, p.
28). Investment is the driving force of the economy. For Kalecki (1971, ch. 10) and in
particular for Keynes (1973a, vii, ch. 11-12) investment is a rather independent variable.
Third, in contrast to the neo-Classical view, investment is not constrained by avail-
able savings in post-Keynesian economics. Rather, investment is the precondition for
savings. In equilibrium an increase in investment will raise the level of aggregate income
such that the new stream of income generates savings equal to the initial increase in
investment. Thus, the identity between investment and savings holds ex post in post-
Keynesian economics. The causation is reversed: Investment causes savings to adjust
via a corresponding adjustment of income (Gordon 1995). For post-Keynesians prices
do not change. Quantities do. Accordingly, investment and savings are equilibrated by
income adjustments and not by the interest rate. Another disagreement to neo-Classical
economics.
Keynes' and Kalecki's version of the principle of eective demand dier, as they origi-
nate from dierent contexts (Davidson 2000, p. 3).
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Recent studies, however, emphasize
the complementarity of Keynes' and Kalecki's contributions to economics by arguing
that, although coming from dierent worlds, they basically followed similar theoretical
approaches and drew similar conclusions. (Lopez and Mott 1999, Cf., Lopez 2002)
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Keynes, on the one hand, was shaped by his neo-Classical environment. In his General Theory he
failed to escape the neo-Classical framework by accepting mainstream hypothesis such as prot maxi-
mizing rms, diminishing returns and exogenous money. Kalecki, on the other hand, was inuenced by
Marx. His models were utterly free of neo-Classical assumptions and thus coherent (Lavoie 2006, pp.
86-89). This lead Robinson (1972, p. 4) to the conclusion that Kalecki's approach was in some ways
more truly a general theory than Keynes '.
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Investment
Investment is the key element of eective demand. It is the main source of economic
uctuations and business cycles (Kalecki 1971, p. 9). So far, investment was assumed to
be an exogenous, rather independent variable. This was especially highlighted by Keynes.
The beginning of Keynes' (1973a, vii, ch. 11) analysis of the inducement to invest
is clearly neo-Classically inspired. He claims that in equilibrium investment is necessarily
such that the marginal eciency of capital equals the interest rate. However, a closer
look on the subsequent analysis reveals that Keynes actually broke with the neo-Classical
tradition (Shapiro 1977, p. 542). It turns out that the marginal eciency of capital
is equivalent to the expected protability of investment, with expected being the crucial
word. The willingness to invest, thus, is determined by entrepreneurs' long term expecta-
tions formed in a world of fundamental uncertainty concerning the future. Investment is
conceived as an autonomous process (Shapiro 1977, p. 542) driven by the animal spirits
of entrepreneurs. Following this view, the fundamentalists of post-Keynesian theory em-
phasized the prevalence of uncertainty and, linked to that, the exogeneity of investment
(cf. Davidson 1972 and Minsky 1976).
However, a long-run analysis of capital accumulation that we want to pursue in this
paper requires an underlying theory of investment which is aimed at identifying its deter-
minants.
While Kalecki's theory of investment also accepts the inuence of psychological factors
especially in times of a crisis of condence (Kalecki 1990, p. 114), he emphasizes the
importance of objective factors in the determination of investment. According to Kalecki
(1971, ch. 10), capitalists do not mainly rely on expectations, as Keynes has argued.
22
Rather, they base their investment decisions upon current prots.
Prots have several positive eects on investment: Realized prots are the preferred
22
Kalecki disagreed with Keynes on the stability of investment decisions. According to Kalecki (1971, p.
2), investment decisions cannot be revised once they are made. This argument is based on the assumption
that investment is carried out over several periods. First the decision to invest has to be taken. Then
capital goods have to be ordered, produced and at last delivered. Changes in investment are costly once
the production of capital goods has started. Thus, Kalecki assumes investment to be constant and not
subject to changes in expectations in the short run. This is the reason why shifts in expectations only
play a minor role in Kalecki's theory of investment (Lopez and Mott 1999).
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source of funds for investment. As we already know from Kalecki's (1937) principle
of increasing risk, capitalists have a strong preference for internal funds, since external
nance would raise the rms' risk of default. Prots also facilitate the access to nancial
markets, since protable rms appear to be credit-worthy. Moreover, realized prots
indicate the prospective protability of investment (cf. Lopez and Mott 1999, p. 297).
Kalecki's theory of investment oers an adequate access point to our investigation of
monetary eects on economic growth and income distribution. Later, we will adopt a
Kaleckian-type of investment function in our model.
Savings
Post-Keynesians reject the neo-Classical hypothesis that the interest rate equilibrates
savings and investment, the former being the precondition for the latter. Rather than
that, savings adjust ex post to investment via changes in aggregate income. As we have
argued above, a given level of investment is associated with a certain amount of income
that generates savings equal to the initial investment.
Dierent types of incomes feature dierent propensities to consume. Since the wages
received by workers are typically lower than the prots earned by capitalists, the former
generally consume a higher share of their income than the latter do. This is also consistent
with orthodox microeconomic theory. On institutional grounds, Kaldor (1966, p. 310)
argues that the distinction is not to be drawn between workers and capitalists, but between
households and rms: The latter institutionally save a large fraction of their prots, which
they need to nance investment, while nearly all households consume most of their income.
The macroeconomic relation between investment and savings was most clearly ex-
pressed by Kalecki (1971, ch. 7). Investigating the determinants of prots, he applies a
national accounting approach. Given a closed economy with no government sector, the
national product can be looked at from an income and from an expenditure perspective.
Thus, the national product can be dened by
National Product = Wages+ Profits = Consumption + Investment.
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Since consumption can be split in a workers' and a capitalists' share, we get
Wages+Profits =Workers′ Consumption+Capitalists′ Consumption+ Investment.
Following the classical savings hypothesis according to which workers consume all of their
income, we obtain
Profits = Investment + Capitalists′ Consumption.
In this simple economy, aggregate prots are equal to private investment plus consump-
tion out of prots. Since capitalists cannot decide on the size of the prots they want to
earn, whereas they are in disposal of their investment and consumption behavior, the cau-
sation necessarily runs backwards from investment to prots (Kalecki 1971, pp. 78-79).
In the aggregate, rms can determine their prots by deciding on their investment and
consumption expenditures. This is the crucial point of Kalecki's analysis. Capitalists as a
class are able to ascertain their income by controlling their investment and consumption
behavior. Now, we can truly comprehend Kaldor's (1956, p. 96) famous claim: Capital-
ists earn what they spend, and workers spend what they earn.` Rearranging the prot
equation to
Profits− Capitalists′ Consumption = Investment
reveals the identity between investment and savings, the latter being the left hand side of
the equation. Since capitalists cannot directly decide on the size of their prots, we can
identify the macroeconomic content of the equation: An increase in investment implies an
increase in aggregate demand. Capitalists will raise their production volume. Aggregate
income will rise accordingly. Since workers spend all their income on consumption, an
increase in the wage rate directly translates into an increase in demand. Higher sales
imply higher prots which are partly saved and partly consumed, the latter again stimu-
lating aggregate demand. Via the mechanism of aggregate demand, investment will thus
generate prots such that, given the capitalist's consumption behavior, savings are equal
to investment.
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The post-Keynesian labor market
Contrary to mainstream economics, post-Keynesians reject the notion of a labor market
with well-behaved supply and demand functions and a price which clears the market.
This is the case for several reasons:
First, as Keynes (1973a, vii, p. 13) points out, workers and capitalists do not bargain
for the real wage which is usually seen as the equilibrating variable in neo-Classical models.
In fact, they negotiate the nominal wage. Since rms set prices, it is also rms who -
depending on their relative power - eventually determine the real wage and not market
forces (Stockhammer 2004b, p. 31). For post-Keynesians, the real wage is determined by
conventions, by notions of justice and fairness (Lavoie 1992a, p. 218). Moreover, since
the wage is also a source of income, it cannot be seen as an ordinary price.
Second, the supply function of labor is not well-behaved and based on individuals
following norms and conventions. Since the income eect empirically dominates the dis-
tribution eect, it seems closer to reality to conceive the labor supply curve as a falling
function of the real wage (Lavoie 1992a, p. 220).
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Third, post-Keynesians reject the neo-Classical production function together with its
free substitutability between capital and labor. In reality, only a certain amount of labor
can be employed given the stock of capital. Nevertheless, production can vary even in the
short run, since rms generally do not produce at full capacity. When needed, they employ
more labor and utilize a higher fraction of their machinery. The relation between output
and employment is represented by a utilization function (Lavoie 1992a, p. 225). Since
there is no substitution between capital and labor possible in the utilization function, a
rise in the real wage will not induce a change in the technological coecients of production
(Lavoie 1992a, 225).
Fourth, since real wages are not determined by the intersection of well-behaved supply
and demand functions, they cannot clear markets.
In post-Keynesian economics, market forces do not bring about full employment, nei-
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According to Lavoie (1992a, p. 222), this is consistent with post-Keynesianmicroeconomics, according
to which individuals try to reduce working loads as long as the following holds: First, they can maintain
their position in the consumers' hierarchy. Second, they do not want to climb up in the hierarchy. Third,
they have the institutional possibility to decide on the working hours freely.
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ther in the short nor in the long run. Rather, employment is determined by the level of
eective demand.
2.5 Credit and money in post-Keynesian economics
An essential feature of the post-Keynesian approach to economics is the claim that a
sound economic theory has to address a monetized production economy (Eichner and
Kregel 1975, p. 1309, fn. 39), rather than a simple barter economy where money is seen
as a veil without any inuence on the principles of economic activity.
The post-Keynesian view on money is shaped by several school of thoughts. It orig-
inates in the so called banking school of the mid-nineteenth century which opposed the
classical quantity theory of money (cf. Wray 1990, ch. 4). Post-Keynesian monetary
theory is also based on Keynes' (1930) Treatise on Money which inspired the so called
circuitist school (Schmitt 1966 and Parguez 1975) and several other heterodox economists
(Minsky 1957, Kaldor 1970, 1982, Moore 1988 and Lavoie 1984) to forge the framework
for a coherent theory of endogenous money. Today, their work is the foundation of the
post-Keynesian view on money. (Cf. Lavoie 1992b, Rochon 1999, Wray 1990, ch. 5 and
Cottrell 1984)
As this paper investigates the macroeconomic eects of an essential monetary variable,
i.e. the rate of interest, an outline of the core features of post-Keynesian monetary theory
is required. This shall be pursued in this section.
The endogeneity of money
For post-Keynesians, money is endogenous in the sense that it is [introduced] into the
economy through a process which remains largely beyond the control of the central bank
(Rochon 1999, p. 57). In contrast to the Monetarist view of a given stock of money which
is basically controlled by the central bank, money is in fact created by the economic
process itself. Money is demand determined, in particular by the demand for loans.
In order to understand the mechanism behind the creation of money, we will follow
Lavoie (1992a, pp. 152-57) in considering the monetary circuit of an economy illustrated
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Table 1: Simple balance sheet of commercial banks
Assets Commercial banks Liabilities
Loans to rms Deposits of households
Y Y
Notes : Y denotes the amount of loans to rms and the deposits of households, respectively.
by the banking sector's balance sheet. For now, we assume a simplied economy consisting
only of rms, households and commercial banks. There has not been any economic activity
in the past and there is no cash in the economy. As we have argued, rms produce and
invest according to their expectations about future marketing opportunities. Assuming
that rms do not hold liquid funds, they need to obtain bank loans in order to nance
production and investment at the beginning of the period. These funds are distributed to
the households via wages and appear as money on their banking deposits. The commercial
banks' balance sheet is depicted in table 1 where Y denotes the amount of received loans
and earned income, respectively. Credits appear on the asset side, money on the liability
side of the balance sheet. Via the economic circuit, credits have been channeled into
deposits. This, again, illustrates the causation of the investment and savings relationship:
Investment leads to corresponding savings. What is crucial at this point, a ow of credit
money has been created ex nihilo, at a simple stroke of the pen. This ow of money is
endogenous; it is the result of the credit needs of rms, consequent to their production
plans (Lavoie 1992a, p. 153). By granting loans, banks create money out of nothing,
initiating the inevitable, the reux of funds backing up the initial eux of credit.
However, this is not the end of our simplied story. Households do not leave their
money with the banks. In fact, they mainly consume. They purchase goods oered
by the rms assuring the latter's income. Hence, rms receive the funds they need to
reimburse their bank loans at the end of the period. In this process, money is destroyed,
just as it was created beforehand (Lavoie 1992a, 155).
Households do not spend all of their income. They save a part of it which we want
to denote by M . Thus, rms selling goods do not realize the entire amount of money
necessary to meet their debt obligations. There remains an amount of M of outstanding
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Table 2: Advanced balance sheet of commercial banks
Assets Commercial banks Liabilities
Loans to rms Deposits of households
M M
Notes : M denotes the amount of rms' outstanding debt and of households' savings, respectively.
debt in the end of the period. The balance sheet of the commercial banks is depicted
in table 2. Not all the money is destroyed. Accountants will identify M as the stock
of money in our simple model. Thus, the variable that is assumed to be exogenously
given by orthodox economics is in fact nothing more than a residual, a remainder of the
economic process of creating and destroying credit money (Lavoie 1992a, p. 155).
For post-Keynesians money is both a ow and a stock. It enters the economy via
production and is determined endogenously by the desire of rms to obtain credit required
for production. These loans create deposits. Thus, money is subject to eective demand
which is the throttle control of rms' economic activity.
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Central banks
As we have seen in our simple example, the money stock cannot be determined exoge-
nously. This is not caused by the fact that we have excluded a monetary authority from
our model, which might have been able to do so. Although the central bank has some in-
uence on the monetary circuit, it cannot change the results achieved above substantially,
even if we want to include it to our economy in the following
25
.
Let us now suppose that households want to hold their money partly as deposits
and partly in cash. Coins and notes are produced by the central bank. As we have
argued above, the banking sector does not have liquid funds for purchasing money in cash
provided by the central bank. Each loan is counterbalanced by a deposit. There are no
excess reserves available. Hence, in order to obtain money in cash that is desired by the
households, banks have to borrow from the central bank. This was pointed out by Hicks
24
For empirical support for these theoretical arguments, see Moore (1988, ch.7), Arestis and Biefang-
Frisancho Mariscal (1995) and Shanmugam et al. (2003)
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For a model also considering the government sector, see Lavoie (1992a, pp. 165-69)
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(1974, p. 54) whose overdraft economy requires rms to borrow from banks who in
turn have to borrow from the central bank.
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By the same token, reserve requirements on
bank deposits can induce commercial banks to incur debts. Following these requirements,
a specic part of the deposits must be backed by liquid funds that again have to be
borrowed from the central bank (Lavoie 1992a, pp. 161-65).
For the banking sector is largely dependent on base money provided by the central
bank, the monetary authority gains some power to interfere in the monetary circuit, since
it can determine the conditions of lending, thus inuencing the behavior of rms and
banks. However, the possibilities are limited. The central bank cannot control the stock
of money generated endogenously in the economy. Moreover, as Kaldor (1970, pp. 8-9)
and Lavoie (1992a, pp. 178-86, 1996a) argue, in reality central banks do not determine
the stock of high-powered money either since they do not refuse to accommodate the
demands of banks.
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As Arestis (1988, p. 5) points out, they cannot aord to jeopardize
the solvency of the banking system. Nevertheless, monetary authorities are especially
powerful in the post-Keynesian view since they determine the rate of interest. As a matter
of fact, this is what central banks do in most countries.
28
Horizontal money supply
In orthodox textbook macroeconomics the supply of money is assumed to be exogenous.
In this view, central banks directly control the stock of base money. Since the money
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In an overdraft economy, banks are forced to borrow form the central bank if they want to mobilize
liquid funds. This is not necessarily the case if we allow for a government sector running budget decits
that are nanced by issuing government bonds. Banks buying these bonds are now able to sell them
to the central bank whenever they need liquidity, rather than to borrow funds. Done in a grand scale,
this system is called market economy. However, as Lavoie (1992a, p. 181) points out, the dierence
between the two regimes is of a legal rather than an economic nature. Whatever the system, the chain
of causation remains the same.
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This view is not undisputed within the post-Keynesian framework as the controversy between the
so-called horizontalists and structuralists, sketched in the next subsection, shows.
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Also in the New Monetary Consensus, the predominant economic theory favored by most central
bankers, the monetary authority is assumed to control the interest rates without leering at any monetary
aggregate. The heart of this theory is the so-called Taylor Rule, a reaction function according to which
the central bank has to set the interest rate under consideration of the ination target, of the output
gap and of an assumed natural rate of interest (Taylor 1993). The new consensus theory relies on the
Wicksellian view that the interest rate equilibrates savings and investment, which is categorically rejected
by post-Keynesians. Moreover, new-Keynesians suppose that tight monetary policy does not negatively
aect economic growth, a fact to which post-Keynesians are strongly opposed to (Lavoie 2004) and which
we want to refute in this paper.
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deposit multiplier
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is assumed to be stable, the mainstream concludes that central banks
are also able to control the stock of broad money. Thus, in mainstream textbooks the
money supply curve appears as a vertical line in the interest rate and money space. Money
is exogenous, the interest rate determined by market forces equilibrating money supply
and demand, the latter being negatively related to the rate of interest resulting from
portfolio decisions.
Things are dierent in the so-called horizontalist view (cf. Kaldor 1982 and Moore
1988) that we want to follow here: Given the interest rate which is determined by the
central bank, commercial banks will provide funds whatever rms want to borrow as
long as they seem credit-worthy (cf. Moore 1988, p. 24 and Robinson 1952, p. 29).
They do not systematically increase the interest rate on loans that are associated with
higher risks. Rather, they simply provide no further loan (Robinson 1952, p. 83). By
granting credits, banks induce the creation of money which was the main conclusion of
the previous analysis. Money is determined by credits. In the credit (C) and interest rate
(i) space, the credit supply curve (CS) is a horizontal line, innitely elastic to changes in
the interest rate (Kaldor 1982, p. 24). The amount of loans granted by banks is, in fact,
only constrained by the credit-worthy needs of rms (CD). Their demand for credit is
inversely related to the interest rate since higher rates are associated with a decreasing
willingness of rms to run into debts. The stock of credit and thus the stock of money
are determined endogenously, as depicted in gure 3. For each level of worthy credit
demand, the central bank will then be induced to provide base money, the amount of
which depending on the so-called credit divisor (Lavoie 1992a, p. 174), the equivalent to
the neo-Classical money deposit multiplier.
Not all post-Keynesians agree on the horizontalist view on money supply. For some,
the supply of money is better characterized by an upward-sloping curve. Accordingly,
some post-Keynesians such as Rousseas (1986) argue that central banks typically do
not accommodate the money demand of commercial banks. For them, the resulting
shortage of base money will cause the interest rate to rise. Similarly, structuralists such
as Pollin (1991) and Seccareccia (1988)) argue that central banks refusing to accommodate
29
It is dened as the relation between the stock of broad money and the stock of base money.
29
iC
CS
CD
C∗
i¯
Figure 3: The horizontalist view on the post-Keynesian money market
impose inconveniences on banks and nancial institutions that eventually call for rising
lending rates. According to another current, the liquidity preference view, the rate of
interest will endogenously rise if banks refuse to provide more money to satisfy the
preference for liquidity (Wray 1992, p. 1159). In this view, banks are assumed to ask
for higher interest rates that compensate for the expansion of their balance sheet which is
associated with higher risk since the banks' liquidity is reduced (Wray 1990, pp. 155-70).
Nevertheless, in what follows we want to stick to Lavoie (1996a) and Rochon (1999, ch.
5) who conclude that all asserted counter-arguments can be basically conceived as specic
cases of a generally horizontal money supply curve. As Lavoie notes, disagreements are
mainly the result of dierences in emphasis (Lavoie 1996a, p. 296) and not of fundamental
nature.
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Thus, in the next section, we want to derive a model of growth and distribution
and introduce the interest rate as an exogenous variable which we want to analyze with
respect to its eects on the real side of the economy.
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For detailed arguments in favor of the horizontalist view, see Lavoie (1992a, pp. 192-212, 1996a) and
Rochon (1999, ch. 5).
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3 The post-Kaleckian model of distribution and growth
In this section a simple post-Kaleckian growth model in the vein of Bhaduri and Marglin
(1990) is presented which has been elaborated extensively by Lavoie (1995), Hein and
Ochsen (2003) and Hein (2007). It serves as the basis which the subsequent empirical
investigation will rest upon.
3.1 The foundations of the model
We suppose a closed economy without government activity. There is no technological
progress and no depreciation of the capital stock. Only one good is produced which can
be used for both consumption and investment. We assume the coecients of production
to be constant. Our simplied economy consists of three groups of agents: rms, rentiers,
and workers. Both rms and rentiers own the means of production. Firms earn prots
which they have to redistribute a certain part of to the rentiers depending on the extent to
which rentiers nance production. Workers sell labor to rms which they get compensated
for by earning a wage.
As the income distribution between rms and rentiers largely depends on the nancial
structure of the rm, we want to follow Lavoie (1995) and Hein (2007) by introducing the
debt-capital ratio to our post-Kaleckian growth model. Recent work by Hein (2008) and
Stockhammer (2004a) also included the equity-capital ratio depicting the inuence of the
shareholder value on prot distribution and on investment decisions. This shall also be
considered here. In order to introduce interest and dividend payments to the model, we
decompose total prots (Π) into retained prots (Πr) and distributed prots comprising
interest payments (Z) and dividend payments (D), i. e.
Π = Πr + Z +D (1)
Firms have to pay interest (Z) for their outstanding debt according to the current rate
of interest (i) and the bonds issued in the past (B). Likewise, dividend (D) has to be
paid to shareholders according to the amount of money per stock that was agreed to be
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distributed (d) and the amount of stocks sold (E). In formal terms, this implies
Z = iB (2)
D = dE (3)
Thus, interest and dividend rate variations can aect rms' nancial payments only as
far as these rms raised money on nancial markets. The fractions of the nominal capital
stock (pK) that are nanced by bonds (B) and shares (E), i.e. the debt-capital ratio (λ)
and the equity-capital ratio (φ), respectively, are dened as
λ =
B
pK
(4)
φ =
E
pK
(5)
We assume the debt-capital and the equity-capital ratios to be given in the short run. In
order to keep our model simple, we assume given ratios at every point in time ignoring
their long-run behavior.
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Contrary to the old post-Keynesian growth models in the tradition of Kaldor (1956,
1957 and 1961) and Robinson (1962) who relied on full employment analysis, we assume
our rms to operate at excess capacity. Following Eichner and Kregel (1975, p. 1305),
we further assume rms facing constant marginal costs up to full capacity utilization. In
order to make things easier, we assume away any xed costs such as overhead labor.
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Thus, provided that they have spare capacities, rms can increase production at constant
unit costs which are equal to unit labor costs.
Following Kalecki (1971), our rms operate in the context of oligopolistic competition.
Prices are set by rms who put a mark-up on unit labor costs. Since prices are always set
before the products are placed on the market, there is no feedback from actual demand on
31
For the endogenization of the debt-capital ratio in simple Kaleckian models, see Lavoie (1995), Hein
(2006) and Hein (2007).
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In the post-Keynesian framework, employment usually consists of overhead labor and direct labor
(Kalecki 1971, p. 44). The former covers those workers who are employed whatever positive level of
output is produced. They are a xed factor of production. The latter is variable in the sense that the
amount of its employment depends on the actual level of output produced.
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the price setting policy (Lavoie 2006, pp. 44-55). As the mark-up determines the prot
over labor costs for every unit produced, the distribution of income between rms and
workers is determined uniquely by the rms' mark-up. The prot share (h), dened as
total prots (Π) over nominal income (pY ), is a positive function of the mark-up (m), i.e.
h =
Π
pY
= h(m),
∂h
∂m
≥ 0 (6)
In Kaleckian growth theory, hence, the distribution of income is given exogenously.
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Interest and dividend payments are distributed prots of the rm and hence not part
of the unit costs which are marked-up in our model. However, it is reasonable to expect
rms to increase prices as a response to an increase in interest payments in order to
achieve a certain level of retained prots.
34
Thus, we assume the mark-up (m) to be an
increasing function of the rate of interest payments (
Z
pK
), which, according to equations
(2) and (4), is equal to the debt-capital ratio (λ) multiplied by the rate of interest (i).35
We get a non-negative interest elasticity for the mark-up:
m = m(λi),
∂m
∂λi
≥ 0 (7)
Given equation (6), equation (7) implies that the prot share is also a non-negative
function of the rate of interest payments, which we want to dene as
h = γ0 + γ1(λi),
∂h
∂λi
= γ1 ≥ 0 (8)
where h, λ and i denote the prot share, the debt-capital ratio and the interest rate,
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This is the essential dierence to Robinsonian and Kaldorian growth theory, according to which the
endogenous adjustment of the distribution of income is the mechanism equilibrating aggregate demand
and aggregate supply. (Cf. Lavoie 1992a, pp. 284-296 and Hein 2004, pp. 149-168)
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In order to keep our model simple and since we are interested only in the implications of variations in
the rate of interest, we ignore the eect a variation in the dividend payments might have on the mark-up.
35
The assumption of an interest elastic mark-up is in accordance with Kalecki (1971, pp. 48-50) who
argues that the degree of monopoly may be inuenced by interest costs. In standard post-Kaleckian
literature (cf. Hein 2004), the mark-up is usually related to the interest rate and not to interest payments
since it is suggested that rms perceive the interest rate as a benchmark for their desired protability.
In our model, however, we want to stick to Kalecki (1971) and the Sraans (cf. Panico 1985 and Pivetti
1985) by looking at the interest rate from its cost side. Since interest rates aect the rms' prots only
forasmuch as they are indebted, we perceive the mark-up as a function of the rate of interest payments
and not only of the interest rate.
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respectively. γ0 captures the fraction of the mark-up and thus of the prot share that
is not inuenced by variations in the rate of interest payments, the eects of the latter
being denominated by γ1. Given a positive debt-capital ratio, an increase in the rate of
interest will induce rms to raise the mark-up on unit labor costs causing the prot share
to increase by γ1λ. Thus, income is redistributed from wage to prot earners.
The Kaleckian growth model is based on two equations: an investment and a savings
function that even up in equilibrium. According to the principle of eective demand,
aggregate demand induces corresponding aggregate supply. The economy is demand de-
termined with investment being the active part of aggregate demand and the driving
force of the economy (cf. Kalecki 1971 and Keynes 1973a). Since the amount of avail-
able savings is not a condition for investment, although the identity between savings and
investment holds ex post, we can model an independent investment function.
For Kalecki (1971, ch. 10), capitalists base their investment decisions mainly upon
current prots, which provide access to internal and external funds for investment, accord-
ing to the principle of increasing risk. Moreover, current prots serve as an anchor which
the expectation of the future protability of investment is based on. Bhaduri and Marglin
(1990) generalized Kalecki's view by decomposing prots into a cost and a demand factor
which enter the investment function separately. In the Bhaduri/Marglin variant of the
Kaleckian growth model, the prot rate (r) which is dened as total prots (Π) over the
nominal capital stock (pK) is split up into the prot share (h) and the rate of capacity
utilization (u) assuming that the capital coecient is constant over time, i.e.
r =
Π
pK
=
Π
pY
pY
pK
= hu (9)
where h = Π
pY
and u = Y
K
.
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Since investment comes prior to savings, it must be nanced independently of sav-
ings by credit. We assume the banking sector to accommodate any credit demand by
credit-worthy business independent of the interest rate. This is in compliance with the
36
Since u relates output (Y ) to the capital stock (K) it can be interpreted as a measure of capacity
utilization as long as the assumption of a constant capital coecient is valid.
34
horizontalist view on money supply pioneered by Kaldor (1982) and Moore (1988), ac-
cording to which the interest rate is determined exogenously by the central bank, while
the stock of money adjusts endogenously to credit demand.
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The dynamics of the econ-
omy does not systematically inuence the rate of interest. Thus, the interest rate enters
the investment function as an exogenous variable.
Summing up, we can depict the investment behavior of rms by a simple linear accu-
mulation function. The accumulation rate (gI), dened as capital formation (I) over the
nominal capital stock (pK), depends on the deviation of the rate of capacity utilization
(u) from its normal rate (un), on the prot share (h), and on nancial variables such
as the debt-capital ratio (λ), the interest rate (i), the equity-capital ratio (φ) and the
dividend rate (d).38 In formal terms, this implies
gI =
I
pK
= α + β(u− un) + τh+ θiλi+ θdφd, α, β, τ ≥ 0, θi, θd ≤ 0 (10)
α represents autonomous investment which is not induced by demand, prots or nancial
variables. β indicates the impact of variations in the deviation of capacity utilization
from its long-run value on the entrepreneurs' investment behavior. Rising aggregate
demand pushes the utilization rate above its standard level implying both increasing
expectations of future sales and a decreasing exibility to react on market competitors
each of which induces rms to raise their investments.
39 τ indicates the direct inuence
of the distribution of income on investment. The prot share can also be interpreted as
37
The central bank determines the prime rate which commercial banks put a mark-up on according to
the riskiness, the period of maturity and the liquidity of the loan. The essence of the horizontalist view is
that commercial banks do not increase interest rates systematically given an increasing amount of credit.
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Considering equation (2) and (4), we know that the debt-capital ratio (λ) multiplied by the rate
of interest (i) is equal to the rate of interest payments ( Z
pK
), i. e. λi = Z
pK
. Equivalently, considering
equation (3) and (5), we know that φd = D
pK
. The rate of dividend payments (
D
pK
) consists of the product
of the equity-capital ratio (φ) and the dividend rate (d).
39
Contrary to Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), Lavoie (1995), Hein and Ochsen (2003), and Hein (2007)
who assume investment decisions to be dependent on the rate of capacity utilization, we follow Duménil
and Lévy (1999), Shaikh (1991), and Lavoie et al. (2004) and model accumulation as a function of the
deviation of current capacity utilization from its normal long-term level. This allows for a consistent and
sophisticated econometric model due to the following reason: The interpretation of the output-capital
ratio as capacity utilization implies the assumption of a constant capital coecient, which does not
hold in reality. Thus, the decreasing trend of the utilization rate over time would bias the estimation
of the accumulation function. Since, according to the authors, output growth does not seem to be a
satisfying approximation for utilization, we split the output-capital ratio into a permanent and transitory
component and put the deviations into the accumulation function.
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an indicator of future prots since it determines the prot margin over the costs accruing
from the production process. A rising prot share implies increasing current prots and
decreasing labor costs per unit of output produced which raises the rms' expectations
of the protability of investments (Marglin and Bhaduri 1990, p. 163). θi and θd are
expected to be negative and quantify the impact of interest payments and of dividend
payments, respectively, on the rms' invest decisions.
40
Increasing nancial payments,
e.g. through an increase in the rate of interest, reduce the amount of internal nance and,
according to Kalecki's (1937) principle of increasing risk, the entrepreneurs' incentives to
invest.
Figure 4 illustrates the accumulation rate (gI) as a function of the current rate of
capacity utilization (u) in the (u, gI)-space. The slope of the curve is given by the marginal
reaction of accumulation towards a one unit change in current utilization, which is β.
The ordinate intercept is determined by the other components of accumulation, which
are α + βun + τh + θiλi + θdφd. As depicted in gure 5, variations in these factors
will cause the accumulation curve to shift upwards and downwards, respectively. Given
a positive interest elasticity of investment and a positive debt-capital ratio, an increase
in the interest rate will have contradicting primary and secondary eects on the initial
position of the accumulation curve, which is given by gI0 . In a rst round, we assume
the mark-up on unit labour costs and, hence, also the prot share to be constant. Thus
an increased interest rate will transfer income only from the rms to the rentiers. As
we have argued, this redistribution of income will reduce retained prots and induce the
rms to cut down on investment. The accumulation curve will shift downwards to gI1. In a
second round, rms react to the increased interest costs by raising the mark-up and, thus,
the prot share. This redistribution of income from laborers to rms will increase the
prot share and induce rms to enhance their investments. The accumulation curve will
move upwards. Depending on whether the secondary eect exceeds the primary eect,
the accumulation curve will end up above or below the initial position, i.e. at gI2a or
40
There are two reasons why interest and dividend payments have not been summarized in the in-
vestment function: First, in the econometric model, we also use them as distinct regressors as taking
them together would blur the link to monetary policy. Second, in contrast to interest payments, divi-
dend payments are also driven by the shareholder value which has gained relevance in recent years (cf.
Stockhammer 2004a).
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Figure 5: Response of the accumulation curve to a positive interest rate shock
gI2b. The overall impact of a rising interest rate on the accumulation curve may thus be
positive or negative. Given a positive interest elasticity of investment the overall eect
of an increasing interest rate on savings depends on the weight of the primary and the
secondary eect as well as on the initial value of the utilization rate.
Contrary to the traditional Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) type of model, we do not
follow the classical saving hypothesis according to which there is no savings out of wages,
only out of prots. Since we want to apply our model to empirical data, we assume
workers to save a part of their wage income (W ), the latter being given by
W = wlY (11)
In compliance with Kaldor (1966), we suppose that the propensity to save out of wage
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income (sW ) is smaller than the propensity to save out of interest and dividend income
(sZ). Total savings (S) consists of the rms' savings (S
F
) and of the households savings
(SH). The former is equal to the rms' retained prots (Πr) which are saved by denition.
The latter comprise the savings out of rentiers' income (sZ(Z+D)) and out of labor income
(sWW ). Given equations (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (11), we can imply for the savings rate
(gS) relating total savings (S) to the nominal capital stock (pK) that
gS =
S
pK
=
SF + SH
pK
=
Πr + sZ(Z +D) + sWW
pK
=
= hu− (1− sZ)(λi+ φd) + sW (1− h)u, 0 ≤ sW < sZ ≤ 1 (12)
where the prot share (h) and the rate of capacity utilization (u) are dened as h = Π
pY
and u = Y
K
, respectively.
Figure 6 presents the savings rate (gS) as an increasing function of the utilization rate
(u). The slope of the curve is equal to h+ sW (1− h). The ordinate intercept is negative
and determined by the negative value of consumption out of rentiers' income, which is
−(1− sZ)(λi+ φd). An increase in the rate of capacity utilization (u) implies additional
income, a part of which will be saved according to the propensities to save out of rentiers'
and labor income and according to the distribution of income amongst rms and workers.
The eects of changes in the rate of interest on the savings curve are depicted in gure
7. Again, a rise in the interest rate involves primary and secondary eects: Given a
constant prot share (h) in the rst round, an exogenous increase in the rate of interest
(i) will diminish total savings as funds are transferred from rms who save their prot
income entirely to rentiers who consume a part of their income. The savings curve will
shift downwards. In the second round, rms will increase the mark-up, thus transferring
funds from workers to the rms. Since the propensity to save out of wages is positive
whereas the propensity to save out of retained earnings is zero, total savings increase.
The savings curve will rotate counter-clockwise, as the increased prot share implies that
for each additional unit of aggregate income a higher fraction is saved.
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Figure 7: Response of the savings curve to a positive interest rate shock
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3.2 Equilibrium
The goods market is in equilibrium when aggregate supply (Y ) is equal to aggregate
demand comprising consumption (Y − S) and investment demand (I). Relating supply
and demand to the stock of capital, we can imply for the equilibrium in the goods market
that
gI = gS (13)
The goods market will equilibrate since any disequilibrium will induce the utilization
rate to move towards its equilibrating level. The Keynesian stability condition implies
that savings needs to react more sensitively to variations in capacity utilization than
accumulation does. Referring to gure 4 and to gure 6, this means that the savings
curve must be steeper than the investment curve in order to get positive equilibria. Thus,
the following condition must hold:
∂gS
∂u
−
∂gI
∂u
= sW + (1− sW )h− β > 0 (14)
Provided the stability condition is satised, we get positive equilibrium values for the rate
of capacity utilization (u∗), for the accumulation rate (g∗) and for the prot rate (r∗) by
substituting equations (10) and (12) into equation (13) and by solving for the endogenous
variables as follows:
u∗ =
λi(1− sZ + θi) + φd(1 − sz + θd) + α+ τh− βun
sW + (1− sW )h− β
(15)
g∗ =
λi
(
β(1− sZ) + θi
(
sW + (1− sW )h
))
sW + (1− sW )h− β
+
φd
(
β(1 − sZ) + θd
(
sW + (1− sW )h
))
sW + (1− sW )h− β
(16)
+
(
sW + (1− sW )h
)
(α+ τh+ βun)
sW + (1− sW )h− β
r∗ =
h
(
λi(1− sZ + θi) + φd(1− sz + θd) + α+ τh− βun
)
sW + (1− sW )h− β
(17)
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Figure 8: The equilibrium values of utilization, accumulation and prots
Figure 8 is the graphical representation of equations (15) to (17). The upper part is the
synthesis of gure 4 and gure 6. The lower part illustrates the realized prot rate curve
which follows from equation (9). The slope of this curve is equal to the prot share (h).
3.3 Eects of interest rate variations on utilization, accumulation
and prots
The eects of a variation in the rate of interest on the equilibrium values of the rate
of capacity utilization, of the accumulation rate and of the prot rate can be derived by
dierentiating the equilibrium positions with respect to the interest rate. The total eects
are given by
∂u∗
∂i
=
λ(1− sZ + θi) + γ1λ
(
τ − (1− sW )u
)
sW + (1− sW )h− β
(18)
∂g∗
∂i
=
λ
(
β(1 − sZ) + θi
(
sW + (1 − sW )h
))
+ γ1λ
(
τ
(
sW + (1− sW )h
)
− βu(1− sW )
)
sW + (1− sW )h− β
(19)
∂r∗
∂i
=
λ
(
h(1− sZ + θi)
)
+ γ1λ
(
τh+ (sW − β)u
)
sW + (1 − sW )h− β
(20)
The reactions of utilization, accumulation and prots to a variation in the interest rate
depend on the coecients of the accumulation and savings function as well as on the
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marginal eect of a variation in the rate of interest payments on the prot share. Taking
only stable equilibria into account, these eects depend on the sign of the numerators in
equations (18) to (20).
Assuming a rigid mark-up in the rst round, the interest elasticity of the prot share
is zero implying that γ1 = 0. Thus, the primary eects of a variation in the interest rate
on the equilibrium values of utilization, accumulation and prots depend basically on the
savings rate out of interest and dividend income and on the marginal response of invest-
ment towards changes in the rate of interest payments.
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Dierent accumulation regimes
can be distinguished, which are represented in gure 9: The normal post-Keynesian case
is illustrated in panel a. An increase in the rate of interest has negative eects on de-
mand, accumulation and prots (cf. Hein 2006 and 2007). This regime is characterized
by rentiers who save a big fraction of their income implying that increasing interest rates
translate only into a merely weak expansion of consumption demand. Hence, the sav-
ings curve shifts downwards only moderately. Entrepreneurs heavily rely on the current
burden of interest payments in forming their investment decisions. Thus, the investment
curve shifts downwards signicantly. What Lavoie (1995) and Hein (2007) call the puz-
zling case is a regime in which an increase in the interest rate has expansive impacts on
the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables, which is depicted in panel c of gure
9. As Hein (2007) points out, this is the case when rentiers stimulate demand by a small
propensity to save and entrepreneurs do not care a lot about interest payments in their
investment behavior. Hence, given an increase in the interest rate, the savings curve shifts
signicantly downwards whereas the investment curve does so only a little. Savings and
investment functions which are sensitive towards changes in the rate of utilization are also
favorable to this regime, as they imply a strong accelerator eect. An intermediate case,
depicted in panel b of gure 9, is also possible. In this case, utilization and the prot
share increase whereas accumulation decreases as a response to rising interest rates. In
general, the debt-capital ratio cannot reverse, but only mitigate or amplify the eects
variations in the interest rate have on the equilibrium values.
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Furthermore, the eect on accumulation depends on the workers' propensity to save, on the sensitivity
of investment towards changes in demand, and on the prot share.
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Panel c: Puzzling case
Figure 9: Dierent demand, accumulation and prot regimes
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Assuming an interest elastic mark-up in the second round, the sensitivity of the prot
share towards variations in the rate of interest payments is positive, i.e. γ1 > 0. Now,
things get more complicated because the indirect secondary eects through the redistribu-
tion of income from workers to rms have to be considered, too. These secondary eects
of a change in the interest rate may reverse, dampen or amplify the primary impacts
discussed in the case of a rigid mark-up. Given a low responsiveness of investment to-
wards the prot share, a high one towards capacity utilization, and a high current rate of
capacity utilization, a rising mark-up induced by an increase in the interest rate will most
likely have a negative impact on utilization, accumulation and prots.
42
In this case, the
positive eect on investment due to an increasing prot share does not compensate for
the negative eect on consumption which is induced by lower wage income. The economy
can be characterized by a wage-led demand, accumulation and prot regime since an in-
creasing prot share reduces the equilibrium positions of all endogenous variables. Again,
the debt-capital ratio can only inuence the dimensions of the total eects of interest rate
variations on the equilibrium values, but it does not account for the relative weights of
the partial eects.
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Figure 10 depicts a selected normal post-Keynesian case. Considering only the rst-
round eects, we observe an intermediate case. A high responsiveness of investment
towards higher interest costs causes a signicant downward move of the investment curve.
A low propensity to save out of rentiers' income implies the same with the savings curve.
The new rst-round equilibrium implies lower accumulation as well as unchanged utiliza-
tion and prots. After the second round, things have changed. Due to a weak inuence of
an increased prot share on investment the investment curve shifts upwards only moder-
ately wheres the savings curve turns counter-clockwise the extent of which depending on
the increase of the prot share. The new and nal equilibrium is characterized by lower
accumulation and lower utilization. Due to the increase in the prot share, the prot
42
A high propensity to save out of labor income may reverse the negative indirect eect of an increase
in the mark-up on accumulation into a positive one.
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This is a contradiction to Lavoie (1995) and Hein (2007) who assume the prot share to be elastic
towards changes in the rate of interest (i) and not in the rate of interest payments (λi). Thus, the
debt-capital ratio does not show up in the secondary eect. As it has an impact on the signicance of
the primary eect, it also determines the relative weights of the two partial eects.
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Figure 10: Responses of the endogenous variables to a positive interest shock in a normal
case
rate function will turn counter-clockwise. Depending on the extent the prot share has
increased and depending on the nal position of the utilization rate, the new equilibrium
of the prot rate will be either above or below the initial one. In the case depicted in
gure 10, the prot rate decreases. All endogenous variables decrease as a response to
an increase in the interest rate. Since the rise of the prot share has a negative impact
on utilization and a positive one on accumulation, we can speak of a wage-led demand
regime and of a prot-led accumulation regime, respectively.
Figure 11 depicts a puzzling case. Again, we observe an intermediate case, after the
rst-round eects have been completed. Given the prot share induced rotation of the
savings curve, a suciently high sensitivity of investment with respect to changes in
the prot share shifts the investment curve upwards and accounts for new second-round
equilibria of accumulation and of utilization which are are higher then the initial ones.
The impact on the prot rate is also positive, as utilization increased given the increase in
the prot share. Thus, the overall eects of an increasing interest rate on the endogenous
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Figure 11: Responses of the endogenous variables to a positive interest shock in a puzzling
case
variables are positive. Since utilization, accumulation and prots expand moving from the
rst- to the second-round equilibria, gure 11 displays prot-led demand, accumulation,
and prot regimes.
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4 Interest rates, output, accumulation and prots in
the US and Germany
This section applies the post-Kaleckian growth model which we have developed above
to data of the US and (West-)Germany.
44
For both countries, we want to identify their
respective economic regimes, theoretically outlined in the previous section, for the period
from 1960 to 2007. We want to nd answers to the question of how demand, accumulation
and prots have responded to variations in the interest rate and in how far monetary policy
can explain the economic performance of both countries since the 1960s.
In the present paper, we want to address the plausibility of the post-Kaleckian growth
model in capturing reality. Thus, we want to stick to our theoretical model as far as pos-
sible, when setting out for empirical analysis. A few issues that might put our results into
perspective have to be claried: First, both the US and Germany are open economies.
However, we do not consider foreign trade or payments in our analysis. Second, equiva-
lently to our theoretical model, our econometric model builds on the assumption that all
net interest and dividend payments of rms are exclusively transferred to rentiers who
receive exclusively these funds as net interest and dividend income. Third, although it
does not hold exactly in reality, we do not drop the implication of the post-Kaleckian
model that the rate of net interest payments of rms is equal to the product of the net
debt-capital ratio and some interest rate. In reality, nancial assets do not fully compen-
sate liabilities since the former do not yield as much interest as interest has to be paid for
the latter. Thus, netting out nancial assets might be a source of distortion. Therefore,
we stick to the rate of net interest payments in our estimations and do not rely on the
product of interest rates and the debt-equity ratio.
4.1 The data
Estimating the growth model discussed in the previous section requires a broad set of data:
For the investment function, we need data on accumulation, on capacity utilization, on
44
In the following, Germany will refer to West Germany until 1990 and, thereafter, to unied Germany.
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the prot share as well as on interest and dividend payments. For the savings function,
data on private savings and on dierent types of income, particularly on wage income and
interest and dividend income are used. The estimation of the marginal reaction of the
prot share to changes in the rate of interest payments requires data on the prot share,
on the interest rate and on several control variables such as unemployment, ination and
aggregate demand. Since these data on the US and on Germany were not available from
one institution, several sources have been utilized, in particular the OECD, European
Commission, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, the Federal Reserve, the Statistisches
Bundesamt Deutschland and the German Bundesbank.
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Accumulation is represented by the growth rate of the net capital stock of the private
business sector. Since there is no reliable data on capacity utilization we relate real net
domestic income to the real net capital stock as a proxy for demand. This is not fully con-
sistent with recent empirical literature where capacity utilization is usually approximated
by the growth rate of real GDP (cf. Hein and Ochsen 2003, van Treeck 2008, Stock-
hammer 2004a). However, our approximation is consistent with our theoretical denition
of the rate of capacity utilization presented in the previous section. The rate of normal
capacity utilization is assumed to be equal to the trend of actual capacity utilization
which has been derived by applying the Hodrick-Prescott lter (λ = 100). For the prot
share, the net operating surplus of the total economy adjusted for the labor income of
the self-employed is related to the net value added. In contrast to Stockhammer (2004a)
where interest/dividend payments and income enter the investment function separately,
we follow the approach by van Treeck (2008) by employing net interest and net dividend
payments of non-nancial businesses. Since both nancial payments and nancial income
are highly correlated, using net values promises more robust results than can be expected
from considering gross values. Equivalently, we construct the debt-capital ratio as the
dierence between liabilities and nancial assets over tangible assets. Both, net interest
and net dividend payments enter the accumulation function related to the nominal net
capital stock.
The savings equation is estimated only for private households since rms' retained
45
For a detailed description of the data set and its sources, see table A1.
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earnings are saved by denition in the Kaleckian growth model. Wage income is indicated
by the compensation of employees. Rentiers' income has been derived from the net interest
and dividend income of private households. In addition to these essential variables, several
control variables have been employed: proprietors' income for the US and Germany as
well as rental income, transfer income, and transfer payments only for the US. Similarly to
the accumulation function, all types of income have entered the savings function related
to the net stock of capital.
For estimating the interest sensitivity of the adjusted net prot share, the rate of
net interest payments has been used, in addition to the following control variables: the
unemployment rate indicating the relative power of rms in the distribution struggle with
laborers; ination indicating exogenous price shocks; the growth rate of real net domestic
income as an indicator for demand.
46
The following two challenges which the author faced in rening the data are worth
being noted: First, our econometric model applies to non-nancial non-residential private
businesses. However, the data set used is not fully consistently based on this sector. Data
on the adjusted net prot share is only available for the total economy, net capital stock
data only for the entire business sector. Since the systems of national accounting changed
several times in the time period considered, for Germany a fully consistent sectoral demar-
cation is not possible. However, since time series based on dierent accounting standards
overlap, deviations between accounting regimes have been corrected for. Second, data
on the net stock of capital is used in our analysis which recently ceased to be published
by the OECD. Its quality might be low. However, this is certainly not true for the US,
where OECD data has been taken from national accounts. For Germany, the OECD used
to estimate a gross capital stock. Comparing this data with AMECO data provided by
the European Commission and with data from the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland
oers a surprising result: The capital stock data seems to be net, not gross as is indicated
46
Marterbauer and Walterskirchen (2002) used GDP growth, the unemployment rate, ination and
the real long-term interest rate as regressors for the estimation of the determinants of the adjusted wage
share in Austria, Germany and several other European countries. Argitis and Pitelis (2001) estimated
an industrial prot share and used the nominal lending interest rate, money wages, the unemployment
rate and a measure of strike intensity as regressors.
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by the OECD (Schreyer and Webb 2006).
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4.2 Stylized facts
In order to facilitate the interpretation of our estimation results it is useful to identify
general trends of some basic indicators of the US-American and the German economy.
For the period from 1960 to 2007, table 3 displays the development of the growth rate of
the net capital stock, of the growth rate of net domestic income, of the rate of capacity
utilization dened as net domestic income related to the net capital stock, of the adjusted
net prot share, of the debt-capital ratio, of the short- and long-term real interest rate, and
of the interest payments related to the net capital stock from 1960 to 2007. All variables
have been averaged over the total period under consideration, over each sub-period, and
over each business cycle.
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In the USA and in Germany, accumulation displays a decreasing trend since the 1960s.
In the second sub-period accumulation was signicantly lower than in the rst one in both
countries. The recessions in the early 1980s sustainably impeded subsequent accumula-
tion. While the USA managed to increase accumulation during the 1990s, Germany faced
a dramatic decline in accumulation rates throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.
Economic growth shows a similar pattern. In Germany, high growth rates persisted
until the mid 1970s and were followed by an economic downturn and stagnating economic
growth. This is also true for the rate of capacity utilization relating output to the capital
stock, which shows a falling trend throughout the entire time period. In the US, growth
rates decreased enormously in the late 1970s/early 1980s, recovered during the 1980s and
1990s and decreased again in the current business cycle. The boom in the 1980s and
1990s has been pronounced and accounts for the high average level of economic growth
47
Comparing the growth rate of the OECD's capital stock with net investment including dwellings
(AMECO) over the OECD's capital stock yields an almost identical curve. This does not hold, if we
compare the growth rate of the OECD's capital stock with gross investment including dwellings (AMECO)
over the OECD's capital stock, nor if we compare it with private non-residential capital formation (OECD
EOL 78) over the OECD's capital stock. However, comparing the growth rate of the OECD's capital
stock to the growth rate of the net capital stock measured by the Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland,
again, yields a similar curve. In short, there is strong evidence suggesting that the OECD's estimations
of the German capital stock should be interpreted as net values, rather than as gross values.
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A local minimum of the growth rate of net domestic income designates the end of a business cycle.
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Table 3: Averages of accumulation, growth, distribution, debts, interest rates, and interest payments over the total period, sub-periods, and
business cycles (in percent)
Total period Sub-periods Business cycles
USA 1960-2007 1960-1982 1983-2007 1960-1970 1971-1974 1975-1982 1983-1991 1992-2001 2002-2007
(vi)
g(i) 3.41 4.14 2.77 4.43 4.33 3.68 2.88 3.01 2.23
y˙(i) 3.27 3.26 3.29 4.22 3.33 2.03 3.63 3.31 2.74
u 83.30 86.57 80.28 91.31 86.31 80.19 78.02 81.27 82.04
h 22.14 21.47 22.75 22.55 20.74 20.61 21.96 23.03 23.47
λ(iv) 14.85 13.88 15.79 11.64 14.09 17.27 21.03 16.02 5.89
is
(i) 2.92 2.75 3.07 2.96 2.20 2.76 4.86 3.04 0.45
i(i) 3.18 1.96 4.26 2.26 0.70 2.22 5.97 4.18 1.81
Zp
pK
(iv)
3.23 2.65 3.79 2.15 3.01 3.16 4.13 3.68 3.38
Total period Sub-periods Business cycles
Germany 1960-2007 1960-82 1983-2007 1960-1967 1968-1975 1976-1982 1983-1993 1994-2003 2004-2007
(vi)
g(i) 4.08 6.15 2.25 8.95 5.84 3.71 3.17 1.71 1.09
y˙(i)(v) 2.55 3.08 2.09 3.36 3.60 2.19 2.63 1.54 2.01
u 53.12 61.65 45.28 74.61 58.22 50.75 46.17 44.58 44.59
h 20.58 20.75 20.42 23.48 20.52 17.87 20.43 19.71 22.20
λ(ii)(iii) 32.75 43.55 24.30 41.63 44.68 43.08 33.07 19.77 −1.31
is
(i)(v) 2.52 1.91 3.06 1.10 1.65 3.01 3.72 2.83 1.85
i(i)(v) 3.79 3.28 4.24 3.20 2.69 4.03 4.58 4.45 2.78
Zp
pK
0.88 0.97 0.80 0.83 1.04 1.06 0.87 0.80 0.60
Notes : g, growth rate of the real net capital stock; y˙, growth rate of real net domestic income; u, rate of capacity utilization; h, adjusted net prot share; λ,
debt-capital ratio; is, real short-term interest rate; i, real long-term interest rate on government bonds;
Zp
pK
, net interest payments of non-nancial private businesses
related to the nominal net capital stock; For a description of the data set and its sources, see table A1.
(i)
beginning from 1961
(ii)
beginning from 1965
(iii)
until 2005
(iv)
until 2006
(v)
German unication in 1992
(vi)
not an entire business cycle
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1
which we observe in the US for the second sub-period. On average, capacity utilization
decreased signicantly from the rst to the second sub-period.
49
Until the early 1980s, both the US and Germany faced a redistribution of income from
prots to wages, i.e. decreasing prot shares. Since the 1980s, prot shares display an
increasing trend, which is especially pronounced in the US. Thus the US prot share was
higher in the rst half of the time period than in the second. For Germany, this does not
hold as the prot share in the 1960s was extraordinarily high.
In the US-economy, net interest payments as a share of the capital stock increased
permanently until the early 1990s and decreased thereafter. In Germany, the development
of interest payments takes a similar course, with the peak in the 1976 to 1982 cycle.
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Although the trend is similar in both countries, the US rate of net interest payments
increased from the rst to the second sub-period, whereas the German rate decreased.
Two causes for the specic pattern of the rate of net interest payments can be identied:
the development of the interest rates and of the debt-capital ratios, which, taken together,
constitutes the rate of interest payments.
In Germany, both the short and the long-term real interest rates show an increasing
trend until the early 1990s followed by decreasing interest rates thereafter. In the US,
interest rates were stagnating until the early 1980s, when they increased tremendously.
After that, interest rates decreased slowly. In the current business cycle the US-monetary
authority decreased interest rates enormously. In the US and in Germany, both short-
and long-term real interest rates are signicantly lower in the rst sub-period than in
the second one. For both the US and Germany, we observe increasing debt-capital ratios
in the rst half of the time period considered and tremendously decreasing ratios in the
second half. Taking a closer look on the data, it can be seen that the latter is caused by
an enormous boost in nancial accumulation beginning in the 1990s, which reduces the
net indebtedness of non-nancial rms.
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The development of the interest rates and of
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The dierence between the US-American and the German rate of capacity utilization is partly caused
by the OECD's inconsistent methods of measuring the capital stocks of the respective countries.
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The dierence between the US-American and the German rate of interest payments partly originates
from the utilization of dierent databases. For a detailed description of the data used, see table A1.
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As has been noted earlier, the decline in rms' net indebtedness has to be interpreted with caution
as it does not depict the rms' debt burden adequately. Financial assets do not fully compensate for
liabilities since they usually do not yield as much interest as has to be paid on debt.
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the debt-capital ratio can explain a big part of the concave form of the trend of the rate
of interest payments.
From the analysis of the economic indicators, several preliminary results can be ex-
tracted: First, an increasing prot share in the aftermath of the recession in the early
1980s is accompanied by declining economic dynamics. This is especially true for Ger-
many, where both accumulation and economic growth show falling trends. In the US
this relationship is perceptible, but weak. Second, in the US we observe a diametrically
opposed development of the rate of net interest payments and of the accumulation rate.
While accumulation gradually declines until the early 1990s, interest payments rise. A
slight reduction of these payments in the 1990s is accompanied by an increase in accumu-
lation. In Germany such a negative relationship can be observed until the early 1980s.
Afterwards, both interest payments and accumulation decline on average. Third, the
increases in the interest rates come along with decreasing accumulation and growth in
both countries in the 1980s and 1990s. However, declining interest rates in the current
business cycle have not been able to boost the economic performance in any of the two
countries. Fourth, no clear relationship between the prot share and the rate of net inter-
est payments can be observed. Fifth, from the development of the interest rates, of the
debt-capital ratio and of the rate of interest payments we can infer the following: The
inuence of monetary policy on the investment behavior of rms increased until the 1980s
(Germany) and 1990s (USA), respectively, and decreased thereafter. This is indicated by
the debt-capital ratio. In the rst half of the period analyzed, it gradually increased im-
plying rising net indebtedness of rms which made them increasingly vulnerable to rising
interest rates. Decreasing net debts of rms which characterized the second part of the
period indicate a lower sensitivity of investment to variations in the interest rates.
Our ndings conrm a conventional classication in literature (cf. Boyer 2000a, Stock-
hammer 2005-06 and van Treeck 2008), which distinguishes three historical regimes of
accumulation: rst, the Fordist accumulation regime from the 1960s to the mid 1970s
characterized by high accumulation and growth, by an anxious redistribution of income
in favor of labor and low real interest rates; second, the period of crisis from the mid
1970s to the mid 1980s with a sharp downturn in capital stock and output growth and
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high ination; third, the nance-led accumulation regime prevailing since the mid 1980s
and characterized by a stabilization of capital stock and output growth, by a redistri-
bution of income in favor of capitalists and rentiers and by an increasing engagement of
non-nancial business in nancial accumulation.
4.3 Estimation results
This section presents our results of estimating the coecients of the accumulation func-
tion, savings function and prot share function, which put together enables us to draw
conclusions about the type of demand, accumulation and prot regimes the US and Ger-
many have been confronted with on average from 1960 to 2007.
At this point, a few remarks on the econometric methods applied are required. It is
common knowledge in modern time series analysis that the OLS estimator will be biased
if the regressors exhibit a unit root (cf. Granger and Newbold 1974). By dierentiation
of non-stationary variables, the consistency of the OLS estimations can be reestablished.
By this modication of the time series, however, some information regarding the long-run
relationship between variables will get lost. The modern error correction approach allows
to consistently model the long-run relationship of economic variables as well as the short-
run dynamics of these variables as long as two conditions are fullled: First, a cointegrated
relationship between the variables of interest has to exist. That is, a linear combination
of these variables must be stationary. Second, traditional cointegration literature requires
that all variables considered must be integrated of the same order. This condition has
been softened by new bound testing approaches by, amongst others, Pesaran et al. (2001).
(Cf. Hamilton 1994 and Charemza and Deadman 1997)
Since the Johansen test (cf. Johansen 1988 and Johansen and Juselius 1990) indicates
the existence of up to three cointegration vectors for each function we want to model, we
tried to estimate error correction models for accumulation, savings and the prot share
both for the US and for Germany.
52
We followed the bounds testing approach by Pesaran
et al. (2001), according to which level relationships between variables can be consistently
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The results of the Johansen tests are presented in Tables A2, A3 and A4.
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modeled, although the respective variables are not integrated of the same order. However,
due to several reasons, we did not pursue the error correction approach any further in this
paper: First, the results derived from the error correction models were insignicant and
not satisfying, especially not for Germany. Second, the Engle and Granger (1987) test
procedure falsies the hypothesis of a cointegrated relationship including all relevant vari-
ables for all functions analyzed.
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Third, in each behavioral equation, there exist essential
variables which do not exhibit a unit root. Thus a precondition for error correction mod-
eling is not fullled according to traditional cointegration literature (cf. Hamilton 1994,
pp. 635-640). Fourth, the Johansen tests most likely have indicated cointegration only
for subsets of the variables considered, as the Engle and Granger test did not conrm the
results in the majority of cases. Fifth, our sample with less than 50 observations is not
big enough for doing reliable error correction analysis.
Simple autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) modeling with OLS-regressions in rst
dierences was chosen as the main estimation strategy.
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Following the general to specic
approach (Charemza and Deadman 1997), we started from a general model including a
bulk of variables and lags and gradually reduced its size by dropping the most insignicant
ones until only signicant regressors remained.
If not noted otherwise, all regression results presented in this section passed the
White (1980) test for heteroscedasticity, the Ramsey (1969) RESET specication test,
the CUSUM parameter stability test, the Doornik and Hansen (2008) test for normality
of the residuals and the Breusch (1978)-Godfrey (1978) LM tests for autocorrelation up
to order 1, 2 and 3, each at least at the 10% signicance level. For reference, these tests
are presented in table A7. Since the time period under consideration covers more than
45 years, tests for structural breaks in the regressions were also required. As presented
in table A8, Chow (1960) breakpoint tests do not provide any signicant evidence for
structural breaks in 1982.
55
All estimations and tests have been performed with Gretl.
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Table A6 illustrates the test statistics of the ADF test on the residuals of the cointegrating regressions.
They fail to reject the null of a unit root in the residuals for any behavioral equation considered at least
at the 5% signicance level, which provides some statistical evidence that, in most instances, there are
no cointegrated relationships in the functions including all relevant variables.
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Almost all variables in levels exhibit a unit root, as is suggested by Augmented Dicky-Fuller tests
illustrated in table A5.
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1982 has been chosen as the potential break in the sample due to three reasons: First, it is close
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Contrary to Hein and Ochsen (2003), we estimated the model parameters only for the
entire time period under consideration and not for sub-periods, since a lack of observa-
tions would question the explanatory power of these results. Nevertheless, we can also
draw some conclusions on the development of the accumulation regimes through time by
applying the estimated model parameters to sub-periods and business cycles.
Investment function
For the US and for Germany, we estimated the investment function given in equation (10)
in rst dierences and including three lags of each variable,
∆gt = β0 +
3∑
j=0
β1j(u− un)t−j +
3∑
j=0
β2j∆ht−j +
3∑
j=0
β3j∆
( Zp
pK
)
t−j
+
3∑
j=0
β4j∆
(Dp
pK
)
t−j
+
3∑
j=1
β5j∆gt−j + et (21)
Accumulation (gt) is measured by the growth rate of the net capital stock and it is
explained by autonomous accumulation (α), by the deviation of capacity utilization from
its normal rate ((u− un)t), by the adjusted net prot share (ht), by net interest (
(
Dp
pK
)
t
)
and dividend payments (
(
Dp
pK
)
t
) and by an error term (et). Aside from the prot share,
all variables are normalized by the capital stock. As may be noticed, the rate of interest
is not explicitly considered in the investment function. It is part of the rate of interest
payments that also takes into account the indebtedness of rms. Assuming that the rate
of interest multiplied by the net debt-capital ratio (λt) does not deviate too much from
the rate of net interest payments (
(
Zp
pK
)
t
), we can interpret θiλt as the marginal eect of
variations in the interest rate on investment. As we are not interested in the impacts of the
shareholder value orientation on investment decisions, the rate of net dividend payments
(
(
Dp
pK
)
t
) is only considered a control variable.
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to the middle of the period considered. Second, in 1982, both countries faced recessions designating the
transition from one business cycle to another. Third, as has been argued by, amongst others, Lipietz
(1997) and Boyer (2000b), Keynesianism has been replaced by Monetarism as the leading paradigm in
economic policy in the late 1970s/early 1980s. Beginning in that time, the German and the US-American
monetary policy has been perceptibly imprinted by Monetarist ideology (cf. Bernanke and Mishkin 1992
and Arestis and Chortareas 2006, pp. 380-4)
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Dummies have been included for years in which the residuals displayed signicant spikes.
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Table 4: OLS-regression results for equation (21): investment function
USA Germany
Constant 0.00 (-0.81) 0.00∗∗∗(i) (-5.82)
(u− un)t 0.30∗∗∗ (8.70) 0.40∗∗∗ (9.90)
(u− un)t−1 −0.18∗∗∗ (-3.01)
(u− un)t−2 −0.14∗∗ (-2.29) −0.25∗∗∗ (-5.15)
(u− un)t−3 0.13∗∗∗ (3.23)
∆ht 0.14∗∗∗ (3.51)
∆ht−1 0.08∗ (1.71)
∆ht−3 0.10∗ (1.90) 0.12∗∗∗ (3.38)
∆
(
Zp
pK
)
t
−1.03∗∗ (-2.53)
∆
(
Zp
pK
)
t−3
−0.52∗∗ (-2.41)
∆
(
Dp
pK
)
t
−0.27∗∗∗ (2.76)
∆
(
Dp
pK
)
t−2
0.27∗∗ (2.52)
∆
(
Dp
pK
)
t−3
0.25∗∗ (2.47)
∆gt−1 0.53∗∗∗ (3.94)
∆gt−2 −0.25∗ (2.89)
dum75  0.01∗∗∗ (3.18)
dum81 0.01∗∗∗ (2.89) 
dum93  0.01∗∗∗ (3.95)
dum07  −0.01∗∗ (-2.33)
Dependent variable ∆gt ∆gt
Period 1965-2006 1965-2007
Observations 42 43
R-squared 0.88 0.87
Adj. R-squared 0.84 0.81
Notes : g, u − un, h,
Zp
pK
, and
Dp
pK
denote the rate of accumulation, the deviation of the rate of capacity
utilization from its normal value, the adjusted net prot share, the rate of net interest payments and
the rate of net dividend payments, respectively. dum75, dum81, dum93, and dum07 are dummies for
the years 1975, 1981, 1993, and 2007, respectively. Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. *, **, and ***
denote the signicance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. For a description of the data set and its
sources, see table A1.
(i)
Coecient has been rounded o to 0, although it is signicantly dierent from 0.
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Table 5: The long-run determinants of the accumulation rate
Investment function:
gI = α + β(u− un) + τh + θi
Zp
pK
+ θd
Dp
pK
USA Germany
Constant 0.00 0.00
(u− un) 0.14 0.15
h 0.14 0.33
Zp
pK
−0.72 −1.03
Dp
pK
0.00 0.00(i)
Notes : g, u − un, h,
Zp
pK
, and
Dp
pK
are the rate of accumulation, the deviation of the rate of capacity
utilization from its normal value, the adjusted net prot share, the rate of net interest payments, and
the rate of net dividend payments, respectively. α represents autonomous investment and β, τ , θi, and
θd denote the long-run coecients of the explanatory variables. All values have been derived from the
coecients of the estimated accumulation function presented in table 4. For a further discussion of the
data set and its sources, see table A1.
(i)
The Wald (1943) test does not allow to reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the coecients of
the signicant lags is dierent from 0 at the 10% signicance level.
The OLS-regression results of the investment function are summarized in table 4.
Following the general to specic method, we started with regressions of the comprehensive
model and gradually reduced the regressors by dropping the most insignicant one and
re-estimating the model. This was repeated until all remaining regressors were signicant
within the 10% level. Although being insignicant, the constant was not dropped in order
to prevent other regressors from picking up its inuence on the endogenous variable. To
the author, it seemed reasonable to include three lags of each exogenous variable, since
investments might take some years to be carried out. Because of autocorrelation problems,
we also included lags one to three of the endogenous variable to our initial model.
In order to allow for an interpretation of the estimation results, the long-run inuences
of capacity utilization, of the prot share, of net interest and of net dividend payments on
accumulation have to be calculated. The long-run relationships between the endogenous
and the various explanatory variables are presented in table 5.
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Except from the rate
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The long-run eect of an explanatory variable x with N lags and signicant coecients β1, β2, . . . , βN
on an endogenous variable y with M lags and signicant coecients γ1, γ2, . . . , γM is given by
∑
N
i=1
βi
1−
∑
M
i=1
γi
.
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of net dividend payments, which does not oer signicant coecients in any of the two
countries, all variables show the expected signs. At the sample mean, we nd a marginal
reaction of accumulation to a 1%-point change in capacity utilization of 0.14 for the US
and of 0.15 for Germany. The prot share has also positive impacts on accumulation
in both countries. In the US, a 1%-point increase of the prot share raises the rate of
accumulation by 0.14%-points, which is equal to the marginal eect of the utilization rate.
In Germany, the marginal eect of the prot share is 0.33 on average, which is considerably
higher than the marginal eect of the utilization rate. Both in the US and in Germany,
the rate of net interest payments has a considerable impact on the rate of accumulation
with marginal eects of -0.72 and -1.03, respectively. Net dividend payments do not play
a signicant role on average.
Our ndings are basically in line with recent literature. Hein and Ochsen (2003) esti-
mate the coecients of capacity utilization approximated by the growth rate of real GDP
and of the adjusted net prot share in a simple partial adjustment model of accumula-
tion including an AR(1) process. For the US and for Germany from the early 1960s to
the early 1990s, they nd coecients of 0.11 and 0.10, respectively, for the inuence of
utilization on investment, which is very similar to our ndings. However, they do not nd
a signicant role of the prot share in any of the two countries, which contradicts our
results.
For several OECD countries, Hein and Vogel (2008) estimate logarithmized investment
as a function of, amongst others, logarithmized real GDP and of the adjusted prot
share in rst dierences. For the period from 1960 to 2005, they get extraordinarily
large elasticities for the accelerator term (US: 2.42 and Germany: 1.61) and negative but
insignicant ones for the prot share. However, there are severe endogeneity problems
in the specication of the investment function, as current investment is an immediate
component of current GDP, which has been used as a regressor. Thus, the accelerator
eect is likely to be overstated.
Naastepad and Storm (2006-07) estimate the logarithmized investment share as a
This long-run eect is signicantly dierent from 0, if the Wald (1943) test allows to reject the null
hypothesis of
∑N
i=1 βi = 0 at least at the 10% signicance level.
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function of the prot share and of real GDP, both variables entering the model in lagged
logs. Regressions were run in levels for some OECD countries from 1960 to 2000. AR
processes have been included. For the US and for Germany, they nd marginal GDP-
eects on investment of 0.12 and 0.27, respectively. This is highly consistent with our
results. The inuence of the prot share, which they have quantied with 0.48 and 0.56,
respectively, is slightly higher than in our estimations.
Savings function
In our post-Kaleckian growth model, savings consist of two parts: rms' and households'
savings. Retained earnings are saved by denition. Hence, we focus on the determinants
of private households' savings. In order to quantify the eects of income redistribution on
consumption demand, the propensities to save out of wage and net interest and dividend
income have to be determined. Savings accrue from dierent types of income. According
to post-Keynesian theory, labor income is associated with a lower savings rate than capital
income (cf. Kaldor 1966). This assumption shall be veried and quantied empirically.
For both the US and Germany, the savings functions have been estimated for the
period from 1961 to 2007. For the US, we estimated the following model in rst dierences
applying the general to specic estimation strategy:
∆
(SH
pK
)
t
= β0 +
2∑
j=0
β1j∆
(W
pK
)
t−j
+
2∑
j=0
β2j∆
(Z i +Di
pK
)
t−j
+
2∑
j=0
β3j∆
( P
pK
)
t−j
+
2∑
j=0
β4j∆
( R
pK
)
t−j
+
2∑
j=0
β5j∆
( T i
pK
)
t−j
+
2∑
j=0
β6j∆
( T p
pK
)
t−j
(22)
+
2∑
j=1
β7j∆
(SH
pK
)
t−j
+ β8ψt + et
Total savings of private households (
(
SH
pK
)
t
) are mainly generated by savings out of com-
pensation of employees (
(
W
pK
)
t
), out of net interest and dividend income (
(
Zi+Di
pK
)
t
), out
of proprietors' income (
(
P
pK
)
t
), out of personal rental income (
(
R
pK
)
t
) and out of transfer
income (
(
T p
pK
)
t
). Since all of these types of income are gross values, the amount of tax
60
and transfer payments (
(
T i
pK
)
t
) may also inuence households' savings.
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We are only
interested in the marginal eect of variations in the wage and rentiers' income, captured
by β1j and β2j (j = 1, 2), respectively. All other variables are perceived as control vari-
ables. In order to estimate coecients that are consistent with our theoretical model, we
normalized all variables to the capital stock. A deterministic time trend (β8ψt) has been
added to the model in order to account for a linear, non-stochastic change in the savings
behavior of private households. The regression results are to be found in table 6.
For Germany, the regression analysis in rst dierences did not oer signicant results.
Hence, we followed the partial adjustment modeling approach by Hein and Ochsen (2003)
who estimated their savings function in levels, included a deterministic time trend as
well as a rst-order autoregressive process to their OLS-regressions and applied Newey
and West (1987) t-statistics that are ascribed to cope with remaining autocorrelation
and heteroscedasticity problems (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993).
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We estimated the
following savings function, eliminated insignicant variables and reestimated the function
until merely signicant regressors were left:
(SH
pK
)
t
= β1
(W
pK
)
t
+ β2
(Z i +Di
pK
)
t
+ β3
( P
pK
)
t
+ β4ψt + β5et−1 + t (23)
The savings of private households related to the capital stock (
(
SH
pK
)
t
) are explained by the
compensation of employees (
(
W
pK
)
t
), by the net interest and dividend income (
(
Zi+Di
pK
)
t
),
and by the proprietors' income (
(
P
pK
)
t
), each related to the capital stock. β1, β2, and β3
measure the propensity to save out of labor, out of rentiers', and out of proprietors' income,
respectively. β4ψt and β5et−1+ t capture the deterministic time trend and the stochastic
rst-order autoregressive process, respectively.
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The regression results for Germany are
also presented in table 6.
From the short-run coecients of the households' savings function, we can again derive
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For a detailed description of the underlying data set and its sources, see table A1.
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After the deterministic time trend and the rst-order autoregressive process have been added to
the model, non-stationarity of the error terms was not a problem anymore. This is conrmed by the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test on a unit root in the error term which yields a test-statistic of -7.06,
allowing to reject the null of a unit root within the 1% signicance level.
60
The rst-order autoregressive process is implied by the condition that et = β5et−1 + t.
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Table 6: OLS-regression results for equations (22) and (23): households' savings function
USA Germany
Constant 0.00∗∗∗(i) (-0.15) (
W
pK
)
t
0.13∗∗∗ (19.11)
∆
(
W
pK
)
t−1
0.11∗∗ (2.08)
∆
(
Zi+Di
pK
)
t
0.99∗∗∗ (5.31)
(
Zi+Di
pK
)
t
0.60∗∗∗ (3.95)
∆
(
P
pK
)
t
0.47∗∗ (2.26)
∆
(
R
pK
)
t
0.85∗ (1.93)
∆
(
R
pK
)
t−1
−0.94∗∗ (-2.18)
∆
(
T i
pK
)
t
0.79∗∗∗ (3.03)
∆
(
T p
pK
)
t
−0.48∗∗∗ (-4.18)
∆
(
SH
pK
)
t−1
−0.31∗∗∗ (-2.91)
ψt 0.00∗∗∗
(i)
(-3.34) ψt 0.00∗∗∗
(i)
(-6.14)
et−1 0.77∗∗∗ (9.54)
Dependent variable ∆
(
SH
pK
)
t
Dependent variable
(
SH
pK
)
t
Period 1963-2007 Period 1961-2007
Observations 45 Observations 47
R-squared 0.66 R-squared 0.996
Adj. R-squared 0.57 Adj. R-squared 0.996
DW 1.94
White 28.89***
CUSUM -1.85**
Notes :
SH
pK
,
W
pK
,
Zi+Di
pK
,
P
pK
,
R
pK
,
T i
pK
,
Tp
pK
, ψ, and e denote the rate of households' savings, the rate of
households' wage income, the rate of households' net interest and dividend income, the rate of propri-
etors' income, the rate of rental income, the rate of households' transfer income, the rate of households'
transfer payments, the time factor, and the residuals, respectively. Numbers in parenthesis are t-values.
For Germany, Newey and West (1987) t-statistics have been applied. *, **, and *** denote the signi-
cance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic. White is the White
(1980) test for heteroscedasticity with the null of no heteroscedasticity. CUSUM is the CUSUM test for
parameter stability with the null of no changes in parameters. For a description of the data set and its
sources, see table A1.
(i)
Coecient has been rounded o to 0, although it is signicantly dierent from 0.
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Table 7: The long-run determinants of the households' savings rate
Households' savings function:
SH
pK
= s0 + sW
W
pK
+ sZ
Zi+Di
pK
+ sP
P
pK
+ sR
R
pK
+ sT i
T i
pK
+ sT p
T p
pK
USA Germany
Constant 0.00 
W
pK
0.09 0.13
Zi+Di
pK
0.76 0.60
P
pK
0.36 0.00
R
pK
0.00(i) 
T i
pK
0.60 
T p
pK
−0.37 
Notes :
SH
pK
,
W
pK
,
Zi+Di
pK
,
P
pK
,
R
pK
,
T i
pK
, and
Tp
pK
are the households' savings rate, the rate of households'
wage income, the rate of households' net interest and dividend income, the rate of households' proprietors'
income, the rate of households' rental income, the rate of households' transfer income, and the rate of
households' transfer payments, respectively. sW , sZ , sP , sR, and sT i denote the marginal propensities
to save out of wage, rentiers', proprietors', rental, and transfer income, respectively. sTp denotes the
marginal reaction of the savings rate to a one unit change in the rate of transfer payments. All values
have been derived from the coecients of the estimated savings function presented in table 6. For a
further discussion of the data set and its sources, see table A1.
(i)
The Wald (1943) test does not allow to reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the coecients of
the signicant lags is dierent from 0 at the 10% signicance level.
the long-run determinants. The marginal eects of the various types of income on savings
are reported in table 7. Regarding the inuence of the rate of labor and rentiers' income,
we get univocal results for both the US and Germany. At the sample mean, the marginal
propensity to save out of wage income is 0.09 in the US and 0.13 in Germany, whereas the
marginal propensities to save out of rentiers' income are 0.76 and 0.60, respectively. As
expected, the savings rate out of rentiers' income is considerably higher than out of labor
income. Hence, Kaldor's (1966) proposition of a lower savings rate out of labor income
than out of prot income and one essential assumption of our Kaleckian growth model
can be conrmed empirically. While the rate of proprietors' income does not contribute
to explaining households' savings in Germany, the marginal propensity to save out of
proprietors' income is 0.36 in the US. The rate of rental income is not signicant in either
country. The marginal eect of transfer income (0.60) is surprisingly high in the US. The
long-term coecient of transfer payments exhibits the expected sign: A 1%-point increase
in the rate of transfer payments implies a reduction of the rate of savings of 0.37%-points.
For Germany, the quality of the estimation may be low, as the CUSUM test suggests low
parameter stability.
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However, the result of a low savings propensity associated with
labor income and of a high one associated with rentiers' income seems to be robust.
Comparing our coecients of the savings function with recent literature, our propen-
sities to save out of wage income are conrmed by most of the other estimations, whereas
our propensities to save out of rentiers' income are higher than the conventional propen-
sities to save out of prot income, which are usually estimated in the literature.
Hein and Ochsen (2003) estimate the savings rate of private households as a function of
the rate of wage income and of the rate of an articially constructed rentiers' income. An
AR(1) process has been added to the model. They do not nd signicant propensities to
save out of wage income, neither for the US nor for Germany. Moreover, their propensities
to save out of rentiers' income exceed unity with values of 1.11 and 1.39, respectively.
These unrealistic coecients are certainly due to their somewhat adventurous construction
of the rentiers' income. They simply multiply the nominal net capital stock with the
61
Heteroscedasticity does not bother us since this is corrected for by Newey and West (1987) t-statistics
applied in the regression.
64
nominal long-term interest rate.
Hein and Vogel (2008) estimate logarithmized consumption of the total economy as
a function of, amongst others, logarithmized wages and prots. For the US, they derive
coecients which are equivalent to the following elasticities of total savings: 0.58 with
respect to wage income and 0.83 with respect to prot income. The respective values
for Germany were 0.47 and 0.88. These elasticities are not comparable to our marginal
eects.
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Nevertheless, Hein and Vogel's (2008) savings dierentials are signicantly lower
than they are in our estimations. This may have various reasons: First, it could be founded
in our assumption of no consumption out of retained earnings. Although we explicitly take
into account savings out of proprietors' and rental income, there may be consumption out
of other parts of retained prots which we do not account for. Second, a low propensity
to save out of proprietors' income, which is conrmed by our estimation of the US savings
function, given a high share of this type of income in total prots, could be a reason for
the low propensity to save out of total prots identied by Hein and Vogel (2008). Third,
they use the adjusted gross prot share which does not account for the depreciation of
tangible assets. Thus, the data basis which we applied is more accurate.
Naastepad and Storm (2006-07) estimate the savings share as a function of the prot
share for some OECD countries from 1960 to 2000. For the US and for Germany, they nd
an average marginal propensity to save out of wage income of 0.12 and 0.09, respectively,
which is very similar to our results. The coecients describing the savings dierentials,
however, imply marginal propensities to save out of prot income of 0.34 and 0.48, re-
spectively, which is signicantly lower than our propensities to save out of net rentiers'
income. Again, the smaller savings dierential may be due to the dierent specication of
the savings function. Besides retained earnings and rentiers' income, prots may include
other types of income which are associated with high consumption and reduce the average
propensity to save out of prot income.
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Since we have calculated the long-run coecients of the savings function, we cannot convert our
marginal eect into meaningful elasticities either.
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Prot share function
In order to nd the marginal eect of a change in the rate of interest payments on the
prot share, we had to estimate the latter's determinants. Functional income distribution
is hard to explain theoretically, since political and institutional settings that may change
over time play an important role. Several factors potentially inuencing the prot share
can be identied: As we have argued in the theoretical model, rms' will increase the mark-
up and, hence, the prot share, if they are urged to remit higher interest payments to the
rentiers. Moreover, a rise in unemployment will strengthen the bargaining power of rms
against laborers. As Kalecki's (1971) degree of monopoly will increase, rms can raise the
mark-up on unit labour costs more easily. Two more parameters have to be considered,
which are relevant for reality, but go beyond the scope of our simple theoretical model:
Exogenous price shocks on consumer goods may have ambiguous eects on the prot share.
They will increase the prot share as long as wages do not rise accordingly. Since trade
unions seek to compensate for losses in the real wage, the prot share might decline, the
extent of which depending on the relative power of the unions. Aggregate demand may
also have positive impacts on the prot share since rms may answer higher demand
not only with an increase in output, but also with an increase in prices.
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Moreover,
rms might want to accrue higher realized prots in order to nance desired investments
internally. Thus, they might increase the mark-up, when capacity utilization and thus
the desire to invest is high (cf. Eichner 1973).
In the style of Marterbauer and Walterskirchen (2002) who estimated the wage share
for Austria, Germany, and several other European countries including, amongst others,
GDP-growth, the unemployment rate, and ination to the OLS-regressions, we estimated
the adjusted net prot share (ht) as a linear function of the rate of net interest payments
(
(
Zp
pK
)
t
), the rate of unemployment (urt), the rate of ination (p˙t) and eventually of the
growth rate of net domestic income (y˙t) representing demand. For both countries, OLS-
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In Kaldor's (1956, 1957 and 1961) growth theory, the prot share increases as a response to a positive
demand shock: Provided that the economy operates at full capacity utilization in the long run, an increase
in autonomous investment, will raise prices. Given sticky nominal wages, the real wages and the wage
share will decline. Hence, the prot share will rise. As the propensity to save out of wage income is lower
than out of prot income, total savings will adjust to the initial rise in investment. The adjustment of
the functional income distribution thus equilibrates aggregate demand and aggregate supply.
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regressions were run for the entire time period considered starting from the following
linear model:
∆ht = β0 +
2∑
j=1
β1j∆
( Zp
pK
)
t−j
+
2∑
j=0
β2j∆urt−j +
2∑
j=0
β2j p˙t−j
+
2∑
j=0
β4j y˙t−j +
2∑
j=1
β5j∆ht−j + et (24)
Apart from one exception, only variables with a unit root entered the model in rst
dierences.
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The current lag of the rate of net interest payments was dropped in the
model, as we wanted to remove negative rst-round eects, which a contractive monetary
policy aimed at cooling o the economy might have on the prot share. Again, we followed
the general to specic estimation strategy. We started with estimating a comprehensive
model with up to two lags for each variable, removed the most insignicant one and
re-estimated the model until only signicant variables remained. Table 8 reports our
regression results.
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Table 9 displays the long-run determinants of the prot share which we have found
in our estimations. Apart from unemployment in Germany, all exogenous variables con-
tribute signicantly to the explanation of the prot shares in both countries. Since we
want to put it into our post-Kaleckian growth model, we are particularly interested in the
coecient capturing the marginal responsiveness of the prot share towards variations in
the rate of net interest payments, denoted by γ1. For both countries, we nd a high sensi-
tivity of the prot share with respect to changes in the rms' net interest costs. In the US,
a 1%-point increase in the rate of net interest payments raised the prot share by 2.44%-
points at the sample mean. In Germany the corresponding eect was 2.16. Thus, the
average rm's price setting policy seems to be extraordinarily sensitive towards changes
in the rm's debt burden. While, on average, the rate of unemployment did not aect
the prot share signicantly in Germany, unemployment played a signicant role in the
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US-ination has been used in levels although it exhibits a unit root because it is theoretically im-
plausible why growth rates such as the rate of ination should have a unit root. Moreover, the power of
unit root tests is weak, as stochastic processes can be approximated by trend-stationary processes quite
well (cf. Christiano and Eichenbaum 1990). Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests on the variables of
the prot share function can be found in table A5.
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Due to spikes in the residuals, dummies were included in the model.
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Table 8: OLS-regression results for equation (24): prot share function
USA Germany
Constant 0.01∗∗ (2.35) 0.01∗∗∗ (6.29)
∆
(
Zp
pK
)
t−1
0.96∗ (1.89) 2.16∗ (1.77)
∆urt −0.53∗∗∗ (-3.29)
∆urt−2 0.34∗∗ (2.61) 0.39∗∗ (2.29)
p˙t −0.09∗ (-1.70)
p˙t−2 −0.10∗∗ (-2.25)
y˙t 0.24∗∗∗ (5.80) 0.18∗∗∗ (3.69)
y˙t−1 −0.38∗∗∗ (-6.30) −0.39∗∗∗ (-7.74)
∆ht−1 0.24∗ (1.93) 0.27∗∗∗ (3.10)
∆ht−2 0.37∗∗∗ (3.66)
dum89 0.02∗∗∗ (2.90) 0.02∗∗∗ 3.19
dum91  0.01∗∗∗ (-4.22)
dum98 −0.02∗∗∗ (-3.18) 
dum99  −0.02∗∗∗ (-2.95)
dum00  −0.02∗∗∗ (-3.10)
Dependent variable ∆ht ∆ht
Period 1963-2007 1965-2007
Observations 45 43
R-squared 0.74 0.83
Adj. R-squared 0.67 0.78
Notes : h, Z
p
pK
, ur, p˙, and y˙ denote the adjusted net prot share, the rate of net interest payments, the
unemployment rate, the ination rate, and the growth rate of real net domestic income, respectively.
dum89, dum91, dum98, dum99, and dum00 are dummies for the years 1989, 1991, 1998, 1999, and 2000,
respectively. Numbers in parenthesis are t-values. *, **, and *** denote the signicance level at 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively. For a description of the data set and its sources, see table A1.
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Table 9: The long-run determinants of the prot share
Prot share function:
h = γ0 + γ1
Zp
pK
+ γ2ur + γ3p˙+ γ4y˙
USA Germany
Constant 0.02 0.01
Zp
pK
2.44 2.16
ur 0.86 0.00(i)
p˙ −0.26 −0.09
y˙ −0.35 −0.39
Notes : h, Z
p
pK
, ur, p˙, and y˙, denote the adjusted net prot share, the rate of net interest payments, the
unemployment rate, the ination rate, and the growth rate of real net domestic income, respectively. β0
represents the part of the prot share that cannot be explained by the explanatory variables. γ1, γ2, γ3,
and γ4 denote the long-run coecients of the explanatory variables. All values have been derived from
the coecients of the estimated accumulation function presented in table 8. For a further discussion of
the data set and its sources, see table A1.
(i)
The Wald (1943) test does not allow to reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the coecients of
the signicant lags is dierent from 0 at the 10% signicance level.
US: At the sample mean, the marginal eect of a 1%-point increase in the unemployment
rate on the prot share was 0.86 in the US. Ination aected the prot share negatively
in both countries, with average marginal eects of -0.26 in the US and -0.09 in Germany.
Hence, on average, trade unions were strong enough to compensate for ination induced
losses in the real wage position of laborers. Surprisingly, demand had negative long-run
impacts on the prot share in both countries. The marginal eects were -0.35 in the US
and -0.39 in Germany. This puzzling result can be explained by looking at the short-run
eects reported in table 8: In compliance with the Kaldor-eect, the prot share increases
with current economic growth, as sticky wages do not immediately respond to the rise in
prices. In the succeeding year, however, labor unions enforce the adjustment of nominal
wages, which reduces the prot share. Since labor unions also attempt to include produc-
tivity increases in their wage claims, the overall eect of demand on the prot share can
be negative if unions are suciently powerful.
Our ndings are partly consistent with Marterbauer and Walterskirchen (2002). In
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their estimation of the determinants of the German adjusted wage share from 1970 to
2000, they nd the wage share to be negatively aected by demand and by unemploy-
ment with marginal eects of -0.25 and -1.11, respectively, which is not in line with our
ndings at rst sight. However, Marterbauer and Walterskirchen (2002) only consider
the eects of current demand and of the rst lag of unemployment on the wage share.
A closer look at table 8 reveals that our short-run coecient of current demand is 0.18,
which is in accordance with Marterbauer and Walterskirchen. Moreover, we nd also a
signicant negative impact of unemployment on the prot share in the second lag, which
neutralizes the positive impact of current unemployment and which has not been consid-
ered by Marterbauer and Walterskirchen. In compliance with our results, Marterbauer
and Walterskirchen (2002) nd ination having a positive impact on the wage share with
a coecient of 0.26. The real long-term interest rate was not signicant. The results
Marterbauer and Walterskirchen derived for Germany seem to hold for most other coun-
tries, they have analyzed.
4.4 Interpretation of the estimation results
In the previous section, we have estimated the coecients of the investment, savings and
prot share functions. Now, we can put them into our Kaleckian growth model in order
to determine the US and the German average demand, accumulation, and prot regimes
with respect to changes in the interest rate. To achieve this, we have to add not only
the estimated coecients, but also several variables to the model such as the debt-capital
ratio, the prot share and the utilization rate. As we are interested both in the entire
period under consideration and in sub-periods as well as business cycles, we averaged
these variables over the relevant time periods before we included them in the model. This
allows us to grasp potential changes in the economic regimes which are based on the
intertemporal development of the rm's indebtedness, the prot share or utilization. We
may get dierent regimes for each time period considered. We assume implicitly, that
the estimated coecients are also valid for each sub-period and business cycle. We can
identify demand, accumulation and prot regimes for the US and Germany in dierent
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time periods by considering the conditions derived in equations (18) to (20). The stability
condition for the goods market equilibrium is fullled for both countries and for each of
the periods considered in the following, as can be conrmed in table A9.
Total period
As a rst step, we derive the demand, accumulation, and prot regimes with respect to
variations in the rate of interest for the US and for Germany for the entire time period
under consideration, which is from 1960 to 2007. Table 10 reports the overall marginal
responses of the equilibrium positions of the rate of capacity utilization, of the accumula-
tion rate, and of the prot rate to a 1%-point increase in the rate of interest, which have
been derived theoretically in equations (18) to (20). The primary and secondary eects
which constitute the overall eects on the equilibrium positions are also presented in table
10.
Averaging over the entire period from the early 1960s to the mid 2000s, we nd that
both in the US and in Germany the parameter constellation of the investment, savings and
prot share functions was such that increasing interest rates, i.e. contractive monetary
policy, had negative impacts on capacity utilization, on capital accumulation and on the
prot rate. At the sample mean, a 1%-point increase in the US-interest rate induced
marginal long-run reductions of the rate of capacity utilization by 0.69%-points, of the
accumulation rate by 0.20%-points, and of the prot rate by 0.11%-points. In Germany,
the equilibrium positions of the utilization, accumulation, and prot rates decreased by
1.46, 0.48, and 0.18%-points, respectively, as a marginal long-run reaction to a 1%-point
rise of the interest rate. Sticking to the classication of Lavoie (1995) and Hein (2007),
these demand, accumulation and prot regimes correspond to the normal post-Keynesian
case. These results partly conrm the ndings of Hein and Ochsen (2003) who also
identify a normal accumulation regime in Germany from the 1960s to the mid 1990s. For
the US, however, they nd the endogenous variables not to be sensitive towards interest
rate variations.
The contractive eects of restrictive monetary policy on utilization, accumulation and
prots in the US as well as in Germany can be explained by primary and secondary
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Table 10: Partial and total eects of interest rate variations on capacity utilization, ac-
cumulation, and prots in the US and Germany from 1960 to 2007
USA Germany
∂u∗
∂i
−0.47− 0.22 = −0.69 −1.27− 0.18 = −1.46
∂g∗
∂i
−0.17− 0.02 = −0.20 −0.53 + 0.05 = −0.48
∂r∗
∂i
−0.10− 0.00 = −0.11 −0.26 + 0.09 = −0.18
where
λ(i) 0.15 0.33
h 0.22 0.21
u 0.83 0.53
β 0.14 0.15
τ 0.14 0.33
θi -0.72 -1.03
sW 0.09 0.13
sZ 0.76 0.60
γ1 2.44 2.16
Notes : The conditions for the eects of an increase in the interest rate on capacity utilization,
accumulation and prots are derived from equations (18) to (20). All values have been rounded o to
two decimal places. λ, h, and u are variables averaged over the entire time period considered and denote
the debt-capital ratio, the prot share, and the rate of capacity utilization, respectively. β, τ , θi, sW ,
sZ , and γ1 are the relevant coecients of the investment, savings, and prot share function, respectively.
(i)
Time series from 1965 to 2005 for Germany and from 1960 to 2006 for the US.
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eects: High sensitivities of investment towards interest payments (-0.72 and -1.03) and
high propensities to save out of rentiers' income (0.76 and 0.60) imply that increasing
interest payments induce rms to restrain investment signicantly. The funds transferred
to the rentiers via increased interest payments are mainly saved and not consumed. Thus,
via this primary channel, an increase in the rate of interest mitigates utilization and
accumulation in both countries with marginal long-run eects of -0.47 and -0.17 for the
US and of -1.27 and -0.53 for Germany. Since capacity utilization decreases in the rst
round while the prot share is still unchanged, the prot rate has to fall as well. The
marginal eects are -0.10 and -0.26 for the US and for Germany, respectively.
As soon as prices adjust to the higher interest costs of rms, the secondary channel via
redistribution of income from laborers to rms can be isolated: At the sample mean, US-
American and German rms which faced higher interest costs tended to increase prices
and thus the prot share enormously (with marginal reactions of 2.44 and 2.16). As
the propensities to save out of wage income (0.09 and 0.13) and the responsiveness of
investment to prot share variations (0.14 and 0.33) are relatively low in both countries,
the redistribution of income from workers to rms transfers means that have mostly been
used for consumption to rms who do not suciently translate lower unit costs which
are implied by a higher prot share into higher investment that would compensate for
the lower consumption of workers. Thus, a negative impact of an increasing prot share
on utilization can be observed in both countries. The rise of the prot share, induced
by a 1%-point increase in the interest rate, causes the equilibrium position of utilization
to decrease by 0.22%-points in the US and by 0.18%-points in Germany. Due to its
negative impact on demand and its moderate positive direct impact on investment, a
rising prot share has also a negative eect on accumulation and on the prot rate in the
US. The marginal long-run reactions of accumulation and of the prot rate to an interest
induced rise in the prot share are -0.02 and something slightly below -0.00, respectively.
This is not true for Germany, where a rising prot share has positive implications for
accumulation and for the prot rate. A 1%-point rise of the interest rate implies the
increasing prot share to cause a rise of the accumulation and prot rate by 0.05 and
0.09%-points, respectively. This is the case because the responsiveness of investment
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towards the prot share is signicantly higher in Germany than in the US. Hence, an
increase in the prot share stimulates private investment to a greater extent than it is
inhibited by the attenuation of demand. As for the positive eect on the prot rate, the
increased prot share reduces demand to a less extent than it directly boosts the prot
rate. To sum up the secondary eect of an increasing prot share on the endogenous
variables, we can refer a wage-led demand, a wage-led accumulation and a wage-led prot
regime to the US and a wage-led demand, a prot-led accumulation and a prot-led prot
regime to Germany.
In the US, the interest induced pro-capital redistribution of income, thus, aggravates
the contraction in demand, accumulation, and prots which has been triggered by contrac-
tive monetary policy and the redistribution of income from rms to rentiers. In Germany,
however, the adjustment of the prot share contributes only to the contraction of demand,
but counteracts, although insuciently, the slowdown of accumulation and the decline in
the prot rate.
Sub-periods
As a second step, we combine the model parameters estimated over the entire period
with the model variables averaged over sub-periods in order to identify the accumulation
regimes of the US and Germany from 1960 to 1982, on the one hand, and from 1983
to 2007, on the other. As can be conrmed by looking at the trends of the economic
indicators summarized in table 3, the rst sub-period is associated with high averages
in utilization and accumulation and low interest rates, while in the second a decline of
utilization and a slowdown of accumulation as well as high averages of real interest rates
can be observed. Equivalent to the examination of the total period, the average marginal
responses of the equilibria of the endogenous variables towards interest rate increases
during each of the two sub-periods are summarized in table 11.
As in the total period analysis, we identify normal regimes for the US and for Ger-
many in both sub-periods. Again, contractive monetary policy has been found to reduce
demand, accumulation and prots. We do not nd a shift in the regimes in any of the
two countries considered. Our results contradict the ndings of Hein and Ochsen (2003):
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Table 11: The eects of interest rate variations on capacity utilization, accumulation, and prots in the US and Germany in two sub-periods
USA Germany
1960-82 1983-07 1960-82 1983-07
∂u∗
∂i
−0.46− 0.23 = −0.69 −0.48− 0.22 = −0.70 −1.68− 0.38 = −2.06 −0.95− 0.06 = −1.02
∂g∗
∂i
−0.16− 0.02 = −0.19 −0.18− 0.02 = −0.20 −0.70 + 0.05 = −0.65 −0.39 + 0.05 = −0.34
∂r∗
∂i
−0.10− 0.00 = −0.10 −0.11− 0.00 = −0.11 −0.35 + 0.11 = −0.24 −0.19 + 0.07 = −0.13
where
λ(i) 0.14 0.16 0.44 0.24
h 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.20
u 0.87 0.80 0.62 0.45
and β, τ , θi, sW , sZ , and γ1 as in table 10
Notes : The conditions for the eects of an increase in the interest rate on capacity utilization, accumulations and prots are derived from equations (18) to (20).
All values have been rounded o to two decimal places. λ, h, and u are variables averaged over the respective sub-period considered and denote the debt-capital
ratio, the prot share, and the rate of capacity utilization, respectively. β, τ , θi, sW , sZ , and γ1 are the relevant coecients of the investment, savings and prot
share function, respectively.
(i)
Time series from 1965 to 2005 for Germany and from 1960 to 2006 for the US.
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First, they nd a puzzling case for the US economy in the periods from 1961 to 1982 and
from 1983 to 1995. Second, for Germany, they identify a shift in the accumulation regime
from a normal case in the rst period to the puzzling case in the second.
Looking at partial eects, the following holds not only for the entire period but also for
both sub-periods: In both countries, interest rate induced redistribution of income from
rms to rentiers contributes to decreasing equilibrium positions of demand, accumulation
and prots. Redistribution of income from workers to rms further attenuates demand
in both countries and the other economic indicators only in the US. In Germany, a rising
prot share has positive implications for accumulation and growth in both periods, which
is, however, not sucient to overcompensate the negative rst-round eects. As we have
derived previously for the economies averaged over the entire period, demand, accumula-
tion and prots are wage-led in the US, whereas, apart from demand, all indicators are
prot-led in Germany.
Business cycles
As a third step, we now consider the six business cycles equivalently to the two sub-periods.
Since this classication allows us to track the development of the model variables, we can
gain insights into the development of the mechanism through which interest rate variations
have aected output, accumulation and prots in the US and in Germany since the 1960s.
Table 12 and table 13 present the responses of the rates of capacity utilization, capital
accumulation and prots towards interest rate variations in each business cycle for the
US and Germany.
For the six business cycles under consideration, we basically derive the same results as
for the periods we analyzed previously. On the basis of our estimations, output, capital
accumulation and prots have been negatively aected by interest rate hikes during every
single business cycle in both countries until the mid 2000s. In the current business cycle,
interest rates do not seem to inuence the endogenous variables in Germany. Considering
the behavior of the impacts of monetary policy over time, no shifts in the regime of
accumulation based on the development of the model variables such as indebtedness, the
prot share and capacity utilization can be observed, neither in the USA nor in Germany.
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Table 12: The eects of interest rate variations on capacity utilization, accumulation, and prots in six business cycles: USA
1960-70 1971-74 1975-82 1983-91 1992-01 2002-07
∂u∗
∂i
−0.36− 0.19 = −0.54 −0.49− 0.24 = −0.73 −0.60− 0.27 = −0.88 −0.68− 0.29 = −0.97 −0.48− 0.22 = −0.70 −0.17− 0.08 = −0.25
∂g∗
∂i
−0.13− 0.02 = −0.15 −0.17− 0.03 = −0.20 −0.21− 0.03 = −0.24 −0.25− 0.03 = −0.28 −0.18− 0.02 = −0.20 −0.07− 0.01 = −0.07
∂r∗
∂i
−0.08− 0.00 = −0.08 −0.10− 0.01 = −0.11 −0.12− 0.01 = −0.13 −0.15− 0.00 = −0.15 −0.11− 0.00 = −0.11 −0.04− 0.00 = −0.04
where
λ(i) 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.06
h 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.23
u 0.91 0.86 0.80 0.78 0.81 0.82
and β, τ , θi, sW , sZ , and γ1 as in table 10
Notes : The conditions for the eects of an increase in the interest rate on capacity utilization, accumulations and prots are derived from equations (18) to (20).
All values have been rounded o to two decimal places. λ, h, and u are variables averaged over the respective business cycle considered and denote the debt-capital
ratio, the prot share, and the rate of capacity utilization, respectively. β, τ , θi, sW , sZ , and γ1 are the coecients of the investment, savings, and prot share
function, respectively.
(i)
Time series from 1960 to 2006.
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Table 13: The eects of interest rate variations on capacity utilization, accumulation, and prots in six business cycles: Germany
1960-67 1968-75 1976-82 1983-93 1994-03 2004-07
∂u∗
∂i
−1.40− 0.49 = −1.89 −1.74− 0.33 = −2.08 −1.96− 0.23 = −2.19 −1.30− 0.10 = −1.39 −0.81− 0.05 = −0.85 0.00 + 0.00 = 0.00
∂g∗
∂i
−0.64 + 0.03 = −0.61 −0.72 + 0.06 = −0.66 −0.73 + 0.07 = −0.67 −0.53 + 0.06 = −0.47 −0.32 + 0.04 = −0.28 0.00 + 0.00 = 0.00
∂r∗
∂i
−0.33 + 0.11 = −0.23 −0.36 + 0.12 = −0.24 −0.35 + 0.11 = −0.24 −0.27 + 0.09 = −0.18 −0.16 + 0.05 = −0.11 0.00 + 0.00 = 0.00
where
λ(i) 0.42 0.45 0.43 0.33 0.20 -0.01(ii)
h 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.22
u 0.75 0.58 0.51 0.46 0.45 0.45
and β, τ , θi, sW , sZ , and γ1 as in table 10
Notes : The conditions for the eects of an increase in the interest rate on capacity utilization, accumulations and prots are derived from equations (18) to (20).
All values have been rounded o to two decimal places. λ, h, and u are variables averaged over the respective business cycle considered and denote the debt-capital
ratio, the prot share, and the rate of capacity utilization, respectively. β, τ , θi, sW , sZ , and γ1 are the coecients of the investment, savings, and prot share
function, respectively.
(i)
Time series from 1965 to 2005.
(ii)
Has been set to 0
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As we have also concluded for the other periods analyzed, the negative reaction of
output, accumulation and prots to interest rate variations during the six US-American
business cycles observed builds on both negative primary and secondary eects: The
negative direct impacts of increasing interest rates on utilization and investment have
been aggravated by an increasing prot share. This supports the proposition that the US-
economy has been wage-led in every business cycle throughout the time period considered.
In Germany, demand is attenuated by increasing interest rates due to negative primary
and secondary eects in every cycle, aside from the last one in which both eects have
been zero. In total, both the accumulation and prot rates react negatively to interest
rate increases, although an interest rate induced rise of the prot share countervails and
mitigates this negative eect. As also concluded for the total period and for the sub-
periods, demand in Germany has been wage-led while accumulation and prots have
been prot-led in every business cycle apart from the last one.
Looking at the development of the debt-capital ratio, further insights can be gained.
The numbers presented in table 12 and table 13 indicate the sensitivity to which the
endogenous variables react to interest rate variations. The responsiveness of the equilibria
positions of the Kaleckian model towards monetary policy largely depends on the net
debt-capital ratio. The less rms are net indebted, the less they care about increasing
interest rates in their investment or price setting behavior. Consequentially, as can be
seen in table 12 and table 13, until the peak levels of indebtedness - for the US in the
1980s and for Germany in the early 1970s - the primary and secondary eects increased
in absolute terms and decreased thereafter. In the US, the overall responsiveness of
utilization, accumulation and prots towards interest rate shocks started with -0.54, -0.15
, and -0.08, respectively, in the 1960s, increased to -0.97, -0.28, and -0.15, respectively,
in the late 1980s and gradually declined until the current business cycle to -0.25, -0.07,
and -0.04, respectively. In Germany, the sensitivities of the endogenous variables started
from -1.89, -0.61, and -0.23, respectively, in the early 1960s, rose to the vertex of -2.19,
-0.67, and -0.24, respectively, and slumped gradually to zero until the current business
cycle. There has been no net indebtedness of the non-nancial business sector on average
in the current business cycle from 2004 to 2007. Since increasing interest rates do not
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imply higher interest costs for the average German rm, it does not reduce investment
nor does it increase prices. According to our model, the German economy is not aected
by interest rate variations anymore. Increasing nancial accumulation, resulting in the
decline of net indebtedness of the business sector which began in the 1980s and 1970s,
respectively, signicantly decreased the sensitivity of output and investment to variations
in the interest rate.
What can be explained?
How can our results contribute to the explanation of growth and accumulation in the US
and Germany between 1960 and 2007? For the US we identify a normal case nding
negative eects of interest rate variations on output and accumulation over the entire
time period. High rates of growth and accumulation throughout the 1960s until the mid
1970s associated with low interest rates are consistent with our story.
The economic slump in the late 1970s/early 1980s cycle cannot be explained by high
interest payments, since real interest rates were low. Moreover, the prot share slightly
declined which is also not consistent to our story of a wage-led US-American demand and
accumulation regime. This business cycle is beyond the scope of our model. A potential
explanation could be that in this period of crisis powerful labor unions dominating the
distribution struggle decreased the rms' degree of monopoly and thus their power to
hand increasing costs over to prices. This might have turned the economy into a prot-
led regime in the short term, not captured by our estimations. The surge of ination
might have reduced the prot share, which is consistent to the negative coecient of
ination in our prot share function. As Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) argue, a prot-
squeeze in this period, which is also indicated in table 3 displaying the trends of some
economic indicators, could have contributed to the economic downturn, overcompensating
the positive eects of low interest rates.
The interest rate hikes in the early 1980s seem to have contributed tremendously to
the slowdown of capital accumulation, because of two reasons: First, the net indebtedness
of rms was high implying a high sensitivity of investment decisions to interest rate
variations. Second, partly as a reaction to the rise in interest rates, the prot share
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slightly increased which cooled o the economy further, given a wage-led accumulation
regime in the US.
In the 1990s, the US managed to stabilize the economy at a moderate growth and
accumulation rate, although the real interest rates were still high and the prot share
increased signicantly. This phenomenon might be explained by the following reasons:
First, non-nancial businesses started to engage seriously in nancial accumulation, thus
reducing net nancial leverage and the sensitivity of investment to interest rate variations.
Second, partly due to increasing nancial and property wealth of private households and
partly due to a change in the social norms, the US-households' propensity to consume
increased enormously, which is not captured in our savings function. The economic boom
in the 1990s was mainly conveyed by private consumption expenditures (cf. Maki and
Palumbo 2001, Catte et al. 2004, and Cynamon and Fazzari 2008). Third, the bub-
ble in the IT-market and attended wealth eects could be responsible for a big part of
accumulation and growth observed in the 1990s (cf. Brenner 2003).
In the current business cycle, accumulation and growth have been slow, although real
interest rates have also been low. An exogenous explanation for this contradiction might
be that in the age of the shareholder value, US-rms tremendously increased dividend pay-
ments (cf. Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000 and OECD 2007, ch. 3), reduced internal funds
and abstained from costly investments. Moreover, the private household's propensity to
consume has almost grown up to unity, thus contributing to high aggregate demand. En-
dogenously, it might be explained by a low net debt-capital ratio. The net indebtedness
of rms today is marginal. Thus, interest variations do not carry much weight in rms'
investment decisions. This could also explain why the low real interest rates today do
not seem to reduce the prot share which even increased. As the average rm is not net
indebted anymore, it does not really benet from low interest rates. Hence, there is no
reason why it should reduce the mark-up. The increasing prot share could probably
also be explained by an increasingly asymmetric power relationship between rms and
trade unions in the context of globalization. However, a high prot share perfectly ts
into our explanation of the moderate growth and accumulation rates in the USA today.
The US-economy, identied as a wage-led accumulation regime, suers from low internal
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demand due to a low real wages.
For Germany, we identify a normal accumulation regime. Thus, a similar story can
be told. In the rst business cycle from the early to the mid 1960s, low interest rates are
associated with high accumulation and growth which corresponds to our predictions.
From the late 1960s to the mid 1990s, rising real interest rates are associated with a
mitigating economic performance, which can be explained by our model. As the prot
share decreases at the same time, in particular until the early 1980s, also Marglin and
Bhaduri's (1990) prot-squeeze explanation for the economic stagnation in the 1970s
sounds reasonable, especially as we nd a prot-led accumulation regime for Germany.
The prot-squeeze in this period of crisis might have dominated the expansive eect of an
increasing wage share on output growth, which can be inferred from the wage-led growth
regime we identied for Germany. Why a falling prot share is coming along with rising
interest rates is beyond the cope of our simple model. Other factors such as powerful trade
unions and inationary tendencies might work as superior explanations for a decreasing
prot share than increasing interest rates.
The interest rate hikes in the early 1980s and the high level of interest rates in the
succeeding years seem to have contributed to the slowdown of accumulation and growth,
which is consistent to our story for Germany. Moreover, from the mid 1970s to the early
2000s, increasing interest rates are associated with a slightly increasing prot share, which
also conrms our predictions. Contrary to the US, Germany did not manage to stabilize
its economy in the 1990s. In consideration of our post-Kaleckian growth model, this is
not surprising given the conservative nature of the German Bundesbank and the high
long-term interest rate in this period.
Similar to the US, the responsiveness of the German economy to interest rate variations
decreased tremendously from the 1980s because rms increasingly engaged in nancial
accumulation, thus reducing their net indebtedness (cf. OECD 2007, ch. 3). This might
be one reason why the German economy did not boost in the last business cycle when
interest rates decreased.
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5 Conclusions
We have analyzed the eects of interest rate variations on capacity utilization, on capital
accumulation and on the prot rate in a simple post-Kaleckian aggregate supply-aggregate
demand model based on the work of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), Lavoie (1995) and Hein
(2007). This model featured an investment function proposed by Bhaduri and Marglin
(1990) to which the rate of interest and the debt-capital ratio as well as the dividend rate
and the equity-capital ratio have been added. The model also included an interest elastic
prot share. Considering only stable short-run equilibria, we have found that the impact
of the interest rate on the equilibrium positions of the endogenous variables is not unique,
but depends primarily on the coecients of the investment and savings function and on
the interest elasticity of the prot share.
Similar to the work of Hein and Ochsen (2003), we confronted our simple model with
data of the USA and Germany from 1960 to 2007. As the main dierences to Hein and
Ochsen's (2003) approach are concerned, our empirical analysis stays close to the theoret-
ical model, includes the debt-capital ratio, uses data on rentiers' net income and on rms'
net interest and dividend payments from national accounts, takes into account the interest
elasticity of the prot share, utilizes a longer data set and applies a dierent estimation
strategy. For the USA and for Germany, we estimated three equations, i.e. the invest-
ment function, the households' savings function and the prot share function, applying
a general ADL approach on each one and on the entire period under consideration. For
both countries, we nd a high sensitivity of investment to changes in the interest rate, a
low propensity to save out of labor income and a high propensity to save out of rentiers'
income. Moreover, we nd a high interest elasticity of the prot share in both countries.
We apply our coecients to three dierent sets of periods: to the whole period, to
two sub-periods and to six business cycles. Both for the US and for Germany, every
single period reveals normal post-Keynesian demand, accumulation and prot regimes in
which increasing interest rates are associated with decreasing utilization, accumulation
and prots. By separating primary eects (through the interest elasticity of investment
and the redistribution of income from rms to rentiers) and secondary eects (through
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the interest elasticity of the prot share), we nd that in the US, the negative total eects
on the equilibrium values of the endogenous variables are the sum of negative primary
and negative secondary eects, the latter implying a wage-led demand, accumulation,
and prot regime for the US. The German economy exhibits a wage-led demand regime
and a prot-led accumulation and prot regime as the redistribution of income from
workers to rms (secondary eect) has negative impacts on output and positive impacts
on accumulation and prots, respectively. No shifts in the demand, accumulation, or
prot regimes have been found in any of the two countries analyzed.
The normal post-Keynesian regimes we have identied for the US and Germany t
the data, in general, well. In the golden age of capitalism, the Fordist era, low interest
rates were associated with high accumulation and growth. In the US and Germany,
high net indebtedness of rms implied a high responsiveness of the economy towards
interest rate uctuations. A slightly increasing wage share enhanced output growth in
both countries. In the period of crisis covering the inationary pressures of the 1970s and
the interest rate hikes of the early 1980s, high net indebtedness of rms on the one hand
and rising interest rates on the other contributed to the economic downturn in these years.
However, according to our model, increasing interest rates should have been translated
into rising prot shares, which cannot be conrmed by the data. This contradiction
might be explained by the inuence of powerful labor unions, which prevented rms that
faced high interest payments to raise the mark-up. In the succeeding era of nance-led
accumulation, the US managed to stabilize accumulation and growth on a moderate level
(by the aid of nancial market bubbles and strong wealth eects on private consumption
demand), although the prot share increased and the interest rate decreased. One reason
for the insensitivity of the economy towards interest rate uctuations is the tremendously
decreasing net indebtedness of US-American rms which is caused by increasing nancial
accumulation. This is also the case in Germany where decreasing interest rates have not
boosted the economy. A net indebtedness of zero implies the economy being perfectly
inelastic with respect to interest rate variations, according to our simple model.
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A Appendix
Table A1: Description of the data set and of the sources
Capital stock (K) Real net capital stock of the business sector (OECD EOL 75, 78;
o.c.)
Accumulation (g) Growth rate of K
Capacity utilization (u) Net domestic income at current market prices of the total economy
(AMECO) deated by the price deater of gross domestic product
at market prices (AMECO) over K
Normal capacity utilization (un) Trend of u extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott lter (λ = 100)
Prot share (h) Net operating surplus of the total economy adjusted for imputed
compensation of self-employed (AMECO) over domestic income
at current factor cost of the total economy (AMECO)
Rate of net interest payments
(
Zp
pK
)
Interest payments net of interest income of the non-nancial busi-
ness sector (BEA NIPA Tab.7.11; o.c.) over K with K inated
by the price index of gross capital formation of the total economy
(AMECO)
Rate of net dividend payments
(
Dp
pK
)
Dividend payments net of dividend income of the non-nancial
business sector (BEA NIPA Tab.7.10; o.c.) overK withK inated
by the price index of gross capital formation of the total economy
(AMECO)
Debt-capital ratio (λ) Liabilities net of nancial assets over tangible assets of the non-
nancial business sector (FED FOF Tab.B.102, Tab.B.103; BuBa;
o.c.)
Savings rate of private households
(
SH
pK
)
Savings of private households (BEA NIPA Tab.2.1; DESTATIS;
o.c.) over K with K inated by the price index of gross capital
formation of the total economy (AMECO)
Rate of households' wage income
(
W
pK
)
Compensation of employees (BEA NIPA Tab.2.1; DESTATIS;
o.c.) over K with K inated by the price index of gross capi-
tal formation of the total economy (AMECO)
Rate of households' net interest
and dividend income (
Zi+Di
pK
)
Interest and dividend income net of interest and dividend pay-
ments of private households (BEA NIPA Tab.2.1; DESTATIS;
o.c.) over K with K inated by the price index of gross capital
formation of the total economy (AMECO)
Rate of households' proprietors'
income (
P
pK
)
USA: Proprietors' income with inventory valuation and capital
consumption adjustments (BEA NIPA Tab.2.1) over K with K
inated by the price index of gross capital formation of the to-
tal economy (AMECO); Germany: Income of self-employed and
transfers from reserves (DESTATIS, o.c.) over inated K
Rate of households' rental income
(
R
pK
)
Rental income of persons with capital consumption adjustment
(BEA NIPA Tab.2.1) over K with K inated by the price index
of gross capital formation of the total economy (AMECO)
(cont'd)
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Table A1 (cont'd): Description of the data set and of the sources
Rate of households' transfer in-
come (
T i
pK
)
Personal current transfer income (BEA NIPA Tab.2.1; o.c.) over
K with K inated by the price index of gross capital formation
of the total economy (AMECO)
Rate of households' transfer pay-
ments (
Tp
pK
)
Personal current transfer payments (BEA NIPA Tab.2.1; o.c.)
over K with K inated by the price index of gross capital for-
mation of the total economy (AMECO)
Unemployment rate (ur) Unemployment rate (OECD EOL 82)
Rate of ination (p˙)(i) Growth rate of deater of private nal consumption expenditure
(OECD EOL 82; o.c.)
Real output growth (y˙)(i) Growth rate of the net domestic income at current market prices
(AMECO) deated by the price deater of gross domestic product
at market prices (AMECO)
Real short-term interest rate
(is)
(i)
Short-term interest rate (OECD EOL 82) minus the growth rate
of the gross domestic product deater (OECD EOL 82; o.c.)
Real long-term interest rate (i)(i) Long-term interest rate on government bonds (OECD EOL 82)
minus the growth rate of the gross domestic product deater
(OECD EOL 82; o.c.)
Notes: OECD EOL stands for OECD Economic Outlook; BEA NIPA for Bureau of Economic Analysis,
National Income and Product Accounts; FED FOF for Federal Reserve, Flow of Funds; DESTATIS for
Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland;
(i)
German unication in 1992
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Table A2: Johansen test for cointegration: accumulation function
USA
Estimation period: 1962-2006
Variables: g, h, Z
p
pK
,
Dp
pK
Rank r Eigenvalue Trace test λ-max test
0 0.62 81.18∗∗∗ 43.71∗∗∗
1 0.42 37.47∗∗ 24.74∗∗
2 0.15 12.73 7.50
3 0.11 5.23∗∗ 5.23∗∗
Germany
Estimation period: 1962-2007
Variables: g, h, Z
p
pK
,
Dp
pK
Rank r Eigenvalue Trace test λ-max test
0 0.57 59.06∗∗∗ 38.97∗∗∗
1 0.24 20.08 12.70
2 0.14 7.38 6.82
3 0.01 0.56 0.56
Notes : g, h, Z
p
pK
, and
Dp
pK
denote the rate of accumulation, the adjusted net prot share, the rate of net
interest payments and the rate of net dividend payments, respectively. r is the rank of the matrix of
the cointegration vectors and indicates the number of cointegration relationships between the variables
considered. All Johansen tests have been performed including unrestricted constants and with lag order
1. The trace test tests the null hypothesis of r ≤ h (for h = 0, 1, ...,m − 1 and m is the number of
variables) against the alternative that r = h + 1. The λ-max test tests the null hypothesis of r ≤ h
against the alternative that r ≥ h+ 1. *, **, and *** denote the signicance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively. Only variables for which the ADF test indicates a unit root have been included to the test.
ADF tests are presented in table A5. A description of the data and the sources can be found in table A1.
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Table A3: Johansen test for cointegration: savings function
USA
Estimation period: 1961-2006
Variables:
SH
pK
,
W
pK
,
Zi+Di
pK
,
P
pK
,
R
pK
,
T i
pK
,
T p
pK
Rank r Eigenvalue Trace test Lmax test
0 0.67 149.00∗∗∗ 51.92∗∗∗
1 0.53 97.08∗∗ 35.08∗
2 0.42 62.00 25.87
3 0.37 36.13 21.78
4 0.18 14.36 9.20
5 0.10 5.16 5.16
6 0.00 0.00 0.00
Germany
Estimation period: 1962-2007
Variables:
SH
pK
,
W
pK
,
Zi+Di
pK
,
P
pK
Rank r Eigenvalue Trace test Lmax test
0 0.70 77.62∗∗∗ 56.45∗∗∗
1 0.25 21.17 13.01
2 0.09 7.87 4.35
3 0.07 3.52∗ 3.52∗
Notes :
SH
pK
,
W
pK
,
Zi+Di
pK
,
P
pK
,
R
pK
,
T i
pK
, and
Tp
pK
denote the rate of households' savings, the rate of house-
holds' wage income, the rate of households' net interest and dividend income, the rate of proprietors'
income, the rate of rental income, the rate of households' transfer income and the rate of households'
transfer payments, respectively. r is the rank of the matrix of the cointegration vectors and indicates
the number of cointegration relationships between the variables considered. All Johansen tests have been
performed including unrestricted constants and with lag order 1. The trace test tests the null hypothesis
of r ≤ h (for h = 0, 1, ...,m− 1 and m is the number of variables) against the alternative that r = h+ 1.
The λ-max test tests the null hypothesis of r ≤ h against the alternative that r ≥ h+ 1. *, **, and ***
denote the signicance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Only variables for which the ADF test
indicates a unit root have been included to the test. ADF tests are presented in table A5. A description
of the data and the sources can be found in table A1.
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Table A4: Johansen test for cointegration: prot share function
USA
Estimation period: 1962-2006
Variables: h, Z
p
pK
, ur, p˙
Rank r Eigenvalue Trace test Lmax test
0 0.73 88.85∗∗∗ 58.70∗∗∗
1 0.31 30.15∗∗ 16.81
2 0.17 13.34 8.35
3 0.10 4.99∗∗ 4.99∗∗
Germany
Estimation period: 1961-2007
Variables: h, Z
p
pK
, ur
Rank r Eigenvalue Trace test Lmax test
0 0.43 53.44∗∗∗ 26.32∗∗∗
1 0.31 27.12∗∗∗ 17.46∗∗
2 0.19 9.66∗∗∗ 9.66∗∗∗
Notes : h, Z
p
pK
, ur, and p˙ denote the adjusted net prot share, the rate of net interest payments, the
unemployment rate, and the ination rate, respectively. r is the rank of the matrix of the cointegration
vectors and indicates the number of cointegration relationships between the variables considered. All
Johansen tests have been performed including unrestricted constants and with lag order 1. The trace test
tests the null hypothesis of r ≤ h (for h = 0, 1, ...,m− 1 and m is the number of variables) against the
alternative that r = h+1. The λ-max test tests the null hypothesis of r ≤ h against the alternative that
r ≥ h+ 1. *, **, and *** denote the signicance level at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Only variables
for which the ADF test indicates a unit root have been included to the test. ADF tests are presented in
table A5. A description of the data and the sources can be found in table A1.
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Table A5: Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests
USA Germany
in levels
(ii)
in rst dierences
(i)
in levels
(ii)
in rst dierences
(i)
g −1.94 −6.02∗∗∗ −2.31 −4.02∗∗∗
u− un −5.55∗∗∗
(i) −5.37∗∗∗(i)
h −2.31 −6.46∗∗∗ −2.07 −5.33∗∗∗
Zp
pK
−2.26 −4.47∗∗∗ −1.50 −6.14∗∗∗
Dp
pK
−0.29 −13.24∗∗∗ −0.59 −6.34∗∗∗
λ −0.50 −3.04∗∗ 1.35 −5.13∗∗∗
SH
pK
0.55 −8.74∗∗∗ −0.84 −6.51∗∗∗
W
pK
−1.00 −2.20∗∗ −1.85 −4.03∗∗∗
Zi+Di
pK
−0.92 −4.52∗∗∗ −0.89 −3.24∗∗∗
P
pK
−1.72 −4.78∗∗∗ −2.45 −3.89∗∗∗
R
pK
−2.47 −2.73∗∗∗
T i
pK
−0.21 −3.79∗∗∗
T p
pK
−0.65 −5.07∗∗∗
ur −2.80(iii) −5.47∗∗∗ −1.24 −4.27∗∗∗
p˙ −1.70 −6.55∗∗∗ −3.03∗∗
y˙ −5.40∗∗∗ −4.86∗∗∗
Notes: The variables in order of appearance denote the accumulation rate, the deviation of capacity
utilization from its normal rate, the adjusted net prot share, the rate of net interest payments, the
rate of net dividend payments, the debt-capital ratio, savings over the capital stock, compensation of
employees over the capital stock, net interest and dividend income over the capital stock, transfer income
over the capital stock, transfer payments over the capital stock, the unemployment rate, ination, and
the growth rate of net domestic income, respectively. We tested down from the maximum lag order 3.
The null hypothesis of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is no unit root. *, **, and *** denote
the signicance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The critical values are taken from MacKinnon
(1996). For a discussion of the data set and its sources, see table A1.
(i)
ADF test without constant
(ii)
ADF test with constant
(iii)
ADF test with constant and trend
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Table A6: Engle-Granger test on cointegration
USA Germany
Cointegrating regression of investment function
gt = β0 + β1ht + β2
(
Zp
pK
)
t
+ β3
(
Dp
pK
)
t
+ et −3.43 4.02∗
Cointegrating regression of savings function(
SH
pK
)
t
= β0 + β1
(
W
pK
)
t
+ β2
(
Zi+Di
pK
)
t
+ et −3.62∗ −2.64
Cointegrating regression of prot share function
ht = β0 + β1
(
Zp
pK
)
t
+ et −2.27 −2.16
Notes: g, ht,
Zp
pK
,
Dp
pK
,
SH
pK
,
W
pK
, and
Zi+Di
pK
denote the rate of accumulation, the adjusted net prot share,
the rate of rms' net interest payments, the rate of rm's net dividend payments, the rate of households'
savings, the rate of households' wage income, and the rate of households' net interest and dividend
income, respectively. * denotes the signicance level at 10%. Given that each variable exhibits a unit
root, the Engle-Granger test implies no cointegration if the ADF test on the residuals of the cointegrating
regression fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. We tested down from the maximum lag order
3. ADF tests have been performed including a constant. The critical values are taken from MacKinnon
(1996). Only variables for which the ADF test indicates a unit root have been included to the Engle-
Granger test. ADF tests are presented in table A5. For a discussion of the data set and its sources, see
table A1.
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Table A7: Various econometric standard tests
USA Germany
Investment function (equation (21)): Specications of table 4
White 5.87 20.97
RESET −2.51 1.04
CUSUM −0.19 1.38
Normality 1.65 0.32
Breusch-Godfrey L(1 ) 1.41 0.00
Breusch-Godfrey L(2 ) 1.97 0.09
Breusch-Godfrey L(3 ) 1.38 0.97
Savings function (equation (22) and (23), respectively): Specications of table 6
White 9.48 28.89∗∗∗
RESET 0.68 0.67
CUSUM 0.65 −1.85∗
Normality 3.99 0.08
Breusch-Godfrey L(1 ) 0.03 0.02
Breusch-Godfrey L(2 ) 0.37 2.81∗
Breusch-Godfrey L(3 ) 0.25 1.85
Prot share function (equation (24)): Specications of table 8
White 9.51 19.24
RESET 0.40 0.53
CUSUM 0.18 −1.06
Normality 0.28 4.84∗
Breusch-Godfrey L(1 ) 0.00 0.42
Breusch-Godfrey L(2 ) 0.68 0.25
Breusch-Godfrey L(3 ) 0.84 0.82
Notes : Apart from the constant, only signicant variables are considered in the tests, as all insignicant
variables have been omitted according to the general to specic approach. *, **, and *** denote the
signicance level of the test statistics at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. White is the White (1980) test
for heteroscedasticity with the null of no heteroscedasticity. RESET is the Ramsey (1969) Regression
Equation Specication Error Test (RESET) with the null of a correct specication of the model.
CUSUM is the CUSUM test for parameter stability with the null of stable parameters. Normality is the
Doornik and Hansen (2008) test for normality applied on the residuals with the null of no normaltiy.
Breusch-Godfrey L(i) (i=1,2,3) is the Breusch (1978)-Godfrey (1978) serial correlation LM test with the
null of no autocorrelation of any order up to i in the residuals.
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Table A8: Chow breakpoint tests
USA Germany
Investment function (equation (21)): Specications of table 4
Year 1982 1982
Test statistic 1.07 0.62
P-value 0.41 0.78
Savings function (equation (22) and (23), respectively): Specications of table 6
Year 1982 1982
Test statistic
(i)
0.79 3.69
P-value 0.64 0.45
Prot share function (equation (24)): Specications of table 8
Year 1982 1982
Test statistic 0.76 1.54
P-value 0.64 0.19
Notes : The Chow tests have been applied for 1982. Apart from the constant, only signicant variables
are considered in the tests, as all insignicant variables have been omitted according to the general to
specic approach.
(i)
As we estimated the savings function for Germany applying Newey and West (1987) t-statistics, the
test statistic of the Chow test is chi-squared distributed.
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Table A9: Stability condition fullled if sW + (1− sW )h− β > 0
Entire period
USA 1960-2007 0.09 + (1− 0.09) ∗ 0.22− 0.14 > 0
Germany 1960-2007 0.13 + (1− 0.13) ∗ 0.21− 0.15 > 0
Sub-periods
USA 1960-1982 0.09 + (1− 0.09) ∗ 0.22− 0.14 > 0
1983-2007 0.09 + (1− 0.09) ∗ 0.23− 0.14 > 0
Germany 1960-1982 0.13 + (1− 0.13) ∗ 0.21− 0.15 > 0
1983-2007 0.13 + (1− 0.13) ∗ 0.20− 0.15 > 0
Business cycles
USA 1960-1970 0.09 + (1− 0.09) ∗ 0.22− 0.14 > 0
1971-1974 0.09 + (1− 0.09) ∗ 0.21− 0.14 > 0
1975-1982 0.09 + (1− 0.09) ∗ 0.21− 0.14 > 0
1983-1991 0.09 + (1− 0.09) ∗ 0.22− 0.14 > 0
1992-2001 0.09 + (1− 0.09) ∗ 0.23− 0.14 > 0
2002-2007 0.09 + (1− 0.09) ∗ 0.23− 0.14 > 0
Germany 1960-1967 0.13 + (1− 0.13) ∗ 0.23− 0.15 > 0
1968-1975 0.13 + (1− 0.13) ∗ 0.21− 0.15 > 0
1976-1982 0.13 + (1− 0.13) ∗ 0.18− 0.15 > 0
1983-1993 0.13 + (1− 0.13) ∗ 0.20− 0.15 > 0
1994-2003 0.13 + (1− 0.13) ∗ 0.20− 0.15 > 0
2004-2007 0.13 + (1− 0.13) ∗ 0.22− 0.15 > 0
Notes : sW , h and β denote the propensity to save out of wage income, the adjusted net prot share
and the elasticity of investment with respect to capacity utilization, respectively. Values are taken from
tables 5, 6, 10, 11, 12 and 13, respectively. For a discussion of the data set and its sources, see table A1.
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B Zusammenfassung (German Abstract)
Erst kürzlich wurden kaleckianische Wachstums- und Verteilungsmodelle um monetäre
Variablen erweitert. Der Zinssatz, der Verschuldungsgrad und die Eigenkapitalquote von
Unternehmen sowie ein zinselastischer Preisaufschlag wurden in das Modell inkludiert.
Empirische Bewertungen der Frage, in wie fern diese Modelle in der Lage sind, die Wirk-
lichkeit zu beschreiben, sind nach wie vor selten. Diese Arbeit versucht, einen Beitrag zu
dieser empirischen Forschung zu leisten. Im ersten Teil werden die Auswirkungen einer
exogenen Veränderung des monetären Zinssatzes auf die Gleichgewichtswerte des Auslas-
tungsgrades, der Kapitalakkumulation und der Protrate im Rahmen eines erweiterten
postkaleckianischen Wachstumsmodells im Geiste von Bhaduri und Marglin (1990) theo-
retisch diskutiert. Im zweiten Teil konfrontieren wir das Modell mit Jahresdaten aus den
USA und aus Deutschland von 1960 bis 2007. Mit Hilfe eines einfachen ADL Ansatzes
werden die Parameter des postkaleckianischen Wachstumsmodells geschätzt und auf ver-
schiedene Zeiträume angewendet, nämlich auf die Gesamtperiode, auf zwei Subperioden
und auf sechs Konjunkturzyklen. In beiden Ländern identizieren wir normale postkey-
nesianische Regime, in denen die Nachfrage, die Akkumulation und die Protrate nega-
tiv auf steigende Zinssätze reagieren. Auÿerdem erhalten wir lohngetriebene Nachfrage-
, Akkumulations- und Protregime für die USA, während die deutsche Ökonomie ein
lohngetriebenes Nachfrageregime, aber ein protgetriebenes Akkumulations- und Prof-
itregime war. Unser Ergebnis bestätigt, dass konservative Geldpolitik zum wirtschaftlichen
Abschwung in den USA und in Deutschland speziell in den 1980er bzw. 1990er Jahren
beigetragen hat.
108
C Curriculum Vitae
Personal Information
Surname, rst name Schoder, Christian
Nationality Austria
Place of birth Amstetten
Date of birth October 11, 1982
Education
since 10/2002 Magister curriculum in Economics,
University of Vienna
since 10/2002 Magister curriculum in Political Science,
University of Vienna
07/2005/-12/2005 Semester abroad at the Australian National
University
06/2001 Graduation from secondary school, Amstetten
10/2004 - 01/2008 Co-registered student at the Vienna University of
Economics and Business Administration
Professional Experience
since 01/2009 Junior Fellow at the Austrian Institute of
Economic Research, Vienna
05/2008-07/2008 Internship at the Macroeconomic Policy Institute
(IMK), Düsseldorf, Germany
03/2007-02/2008 Teaching assistant at the Department of
Economics, University of Vienna
10/2004-02/2005 Tutor at the Department of Economics, University
of Vienna
109
